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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the problem of learning a first-order theorem prover that uses
a representation of beliefs in mathematical claims to construct proofs. The inspiration for
doing so comes from the practices of human mathematicians where “plausible reasoning”
is applied in addition to deductive reasoning to find proofs.
Towards this end, we introduce a representation of beliefs that assigns probabilities to
the exhaustive and mutually exclusive first-order possibilities found in Hintikka’s theory
of distributive normal forms. The representation supports Bayesian update, induces a
distribution on statements that does not enforce that logically equivalent statements are
assigned the same probability, and suggests an embedding of statements into an associated
Hilbert space.
We then examine conjecturing as model selection and an alternating-turn game of
determining consistency. The game is amenable (in principle) to self-play training to learn
beliefs and derive a prover that is complete when logical omniscience is attained and sound
when beliefs are reasonable. The representation has super-exponential space requirements
as a function of quantifier depth so the ideas in this paper should be taken as theoretical.
We will comment on how abstractions can be used to control the space requirements at the
cost of completeness.
Keywords: theorem proving, logical uncertainty, conjecturing, game play, distributive
normal forms
1. Introduction
The process of discovering a mathematical proof can be seen as a perfect information game
where the goal is to show that a path exists (i.e., the proof) between a given starting state
(i.e., the axioms) and ending state (i.e., the claim) using a predefined collection of rules (i.e.,
deduction). Like other perfect information games such as Go and Chess, the complexity of
the theorem proving game involves managing the combinatorial nature of the search space.
We can do this, for instance, by identifying useful heuristics and patterns. This is one sense
in which players can learn and improve from their experiences playing the game.
The idea of “learning from experience” suggests that we can apply machine learning
to learn these heuristics and patterns as opposed to distilling them manually from human
experience. Towards this end, researchers have demonstrated that machine learned algo-
rithms can navigate the search spaces of Go (Silver et al., 2016) and Chess (Silver et al.,
2017) at a level exceeding human experts (i.e., consistently defeat the best human play-
ers). Researchers have also experimented with applying machine learning to theorem
provers (e.g., see Komendantskaya et al., 2012; Kaliszyk et al., 2014; Gauthier et al., 2017;
Duncan, 2002; Selsam et al., 2018; Kaliszyk et al., 2017; Irving et al., 2016; Loos et al.,
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2017; Kaliszyk et al., 2018; Huang et al., 2018), although the problem is much more dif-
ficult compared to Go and Chess when quantifiers are involved.1
In this paper, we consider the problem of learning a prover for first-order logic,2 a well-
understood setting with quantification, where we directly use a representation of beliefs
in mathematical claims to construct proofs.3 The inspiration for doing so comes from the
practices of human mathematicians where “plausible reasoning”4 is used in addition to
deductive reasoning to discover proofs.5
We start by introducing a representation of beliefs that assigns probabilities to the
exhaustive and mutually exclusive first-order possibilities found in the theory of first-order
distributive normal forms (dnfs) devised by the philosopher Jaakko Hintikka (Section 3).
The idea of assigning weights to dnfs has been proposed by Hintikka (1970) in the context of
inductive philosophy so the idea is not new. Our contribution here is extract and formalize
some of these ideas for the purposes of “learning to prove”. We show that the representation
supports a form of Bayesian update and induces a distribution on the validity of first-order
statements that does not enforce that logically equivalent statements are assigned the same
probability—otherwise, we would end up in a circular situation where we require a prover in
order to assign probabilities. In addition, we show that there is an embedding of first-order
statements into an associated Hilbert space where mutual exclusion in logic translates into
orthogonality in the space.
Next, we consider two applications that a direct probabilistic representation of beliefs
in mathematical claims has for “learning to prove”. First, we identify conjecturing as a
form of (statistical) model selection (Section 4). Second, we introduce an alternating-turn
game that involves determining the consistency of possibilities (Section 5). The game is
amenable (in principle) to self-play training, a technique that has demonstrated success in
learning expert-level play for the games of Go and Chess, to learn beliefs that can be used
to construct a prover that is complete when logical omniscience6 is attained and sound
provided that players maintain reasonable7 beliefs. Implementing and empirically testing
self-play for these games is technically challenging and beyond the scope of this paper.
The ideas in this paper should be taken with one major caveat: the space complexity of
the representation is (highly) super-exponential as a function of quantifier depth (i.e., the
1. The state spaces of Chess and Go, albeit large, are finite. In contrast, quantifiers can range over infinite
domains.
2. First-order logic along with the axioms of set theory are expressive—they are in principle sufficient to
encode most of modern mathematics, although humans generally work at a higher level of abstraction
and within a natural language extended with mathematical concepts as opposed to a formal language.
3. The literature on automated theorem proving is expansive see (e.g., see Fitting, 2012, for a survey of first-
order methods). Most provers use a proof-theoretic system as the primary abstraction for representing
mathematical knowledge.
4. Po´lya has written extensively on plausible reasoning, i.e., the heuristic and non-deductive aspects of
mathematical reasoning, including (1) weighing evidence for and against a conjecture, (2) making physical
analogies, and (3) reasoning from randomness (e.g., see Po´lya, 1990a,b, 2004).
5. The non-deductive aspects of mathematical reasoning has been recognized by mathematicians and
philosophers (e.g., see Hacking, 1967; Corfield, 2003; Parikh, 2010; Seidenfeld et al., 2012; Mazur, 2014).
6. An agent is logically omniscient if it knows all the logical consequences that follow from a set of axioms.
Consequently, logical omniscience should fail in the interim while learning a prover—there is nothing to
learn if an agent already possesses knowledge of all theorems.
7. Roughly speaking, an agent is reasonable if it does not assign zero probability to a possibility that it has
not been able to falsify. We will define this formally in Section 3.1.3.
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maximal number of nested quantifiers) so that the ideas are not practically implementable
without modification. Thus our analysis in its current form should only be seen as con-
ducting a thought experiment. As a step towards making the ideas here more practical, we
will comment on how to control the sizes of the representations at the cost of completeness
by treating certain combinations of properties as observationally indistinguishable, i.e., by
making abstractions and lazily considering more properties as needed (Section 6). This
suggests a path towards implementation (e.g., for the game).
As one final qualification concerning the ideas in this paper, we acknowledge that we
have taken a somewhat narrow view of “learning to prove”. First, we restrict ourselves to a
first-order axiomatic view of mathematics.8 Second, we consider only a probabilistic aspect
of plausible reasoning.9 Finally, we emphasize that our work is not human-style theorem
proving (e.g., see Ganesalingam and Gowers, 2017) even though we take inspiration from
human mathematicians. In spite of these limitations and shortcomings, we believe that
the ideas presented here offer a descriptive account of “learning to prove” that cohesively
accounts for the role of beliefs in the proving process, the utility of conjecturing, and the
value of abstraction.
2. Preliminaries
We begin by setting up the notation and terminology we will use throughout this paper
(Section 2.1). Next, we provide intuition for Hintikka’s dnfs (Section 2.2) and then introduce
them formally for first-order logic without equality10 (Section 2.3). For more background
on dnfs, we refer the reader to (Hintikka, 1965, 1973; Nelte, 1997).
8. Although the axiomatic approach to mathematics is widely adopted, mathematicians typically do not
carry out the paradigm to its full extent and write completely formal proofs. When they do, there are
a variety of formal languages they can choose from in addition to first-order logic including higher-order
logic and type theories. The practicality of formalizing mathematics has been aided by the development
of tools called interactive theorem provers. (For instance, Gonthier et al. (2013) formalized the Feit-
Thompson theorem, a deep result in group theory, using an interactive theorem prover.) There are
interactive theorem provers based on first-order logic (e.g., see Mizar, accessed 2019-4-6), higher-order
logic (e.g., see Isabelle, accessed 2019-3-31), and type theories (e.g., see Coq, accessed 2019-3-31). An
interesting direction of future work would be to see how the ideas in this paper apply to higher-order
and type-theoretic settings.
9. The use of probabilistic reasoning to model plausible reasoning is not a new idea—for instance, see work
on probabilistic graphical models (Pearl, 1988) and work on inductive inference (e.g., see Solomonoff,
1964a,b; Jaeger, 2005). The field of automated reasoning (e.g., see Robinson and Voronkov, 2001b,a, for
a survey) contains work on other forms of non-deductive reasoning including reasoning by induction (e.g.,
see Quinlan, 1986; Bundy, 2001; Comon, 2001), abduction (e.g., see Console et al., 1991; Mayer and Pirri,
1993; Gabbay et al., 1998; Denecker and Kakas, 2002), and analogy (e.g., see Davies and Russell, 1987;
Ashley, 1988; Russell, 1988).
10. The restriction to first-order logic without equality is for simplicity: dnfs are defined for first-order
logic with equality as well. All results given here apply to dnfs in both cases with the appropriate
modifications. The difference between the two is between an inclusive treatment of quantifiers (without
equality) and an exclusive treatment of quantifiers (with equality). As usual, note that we can include a
binary predicate that encodes equality in first-order logic without equality, the difference with the case
of first-order logic with equality being that structures may not necessarily be normal.
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2.1 Notation and Background
Let 2 , {0, 1}. We will interchangeably use ⊥ for 0 (false) and ⊤ for 1 (true). N denotes
the set of naturals and N+ denotes the set of positive naturals. R denotes the set of reals
and R+ denotes the set of positive reals.
We write Set(X) ∼= X → 2 to indicate the power set of X. We write |X| for the
cardinality of the set X. We will often write a binary relation such as ∼: X × X → 2 in
infix notation as x ∼ y ,∼ (x, y) for x ∈ X and y ∈ X. The notation {x | P (x)} where
P : X → 2 is a predicate on a set X indicates a set comprehension. We also write set
comprehensions for indexed sets as {xi | P (i)} where P : I → 2 is a predicate on an index
set I that indexes X.
When order matters, we use 〈·〉 for sequences instead of {·}. We write Seqn(X) , {〈x |
x ∈ X〉 | |〈x | x ∈ X〉| = n} for the set of length n sequences comprised of elements from
X. We write Strn(X) for the set of length n strings comprised of elements from X.
We will use ellipsis notation “. . . ” frequently in this paper. As usual, it means “fill
in the dots with all the missing elements in between”. For example, x1, . . . , xn gives the
elements x1, x2, and so on until xn. When the commas are omitted as in x1 . . . xn, the
notation indicates a string of those elements instead.
2.1.1 First-order logic
The syntax of first-order logic (without equality) is summarized below.
M , x | c | fn(M1, . . . ,Mn) | P
n(M1, . . . ,Mn)
φ ,M | ¬φ | φ ∨ φ | (∃x)φ
We use the meta-variable M to refer to terms. A term is either a variable x, a constant c, a
n-ary function fn(M1, . . . ,Mn) applied to n terms, or a n-ary predicate P
n(M1, . . . ,Mn) on
n terms. We use the meta-variable φ to refer to formulas. A formula is either a term (M),
the logical negation of a formula (¬φ), the logical or of two formulas (φ∨φ), or an existential
quantification ((∃x)φ). As usual, we encode logical and as φ1 ∧ φ2 , ¬(¬φ1 ∨ ¬φ2) and
universal quantification as (∀x)φ , ¬(∃x)¬φ where we assume the usual precedence and use
additional (meta-level) parentheses to aid the parsing of formulas. The meta-level notation
(±)bφ where b ∈ 2 either negates the formula (±)0φ , ¬φ or leaves it alone (±)1φ , φ.
We write a formula with free variables as φ[xi1 , . . . , xin ] where x1, x2, . . . is a supply of
free variables. A formula without free variables is called a sentence.
We use a standard deductive system for first-order logic and write φ1 ⊢ φ2 if there
is a derivation of φ2 using φ1, any logical axioms, and the rules of inference. We write
Γ = {φ1, . . . , φn} to be a set of sentences. We say that Γ is consistent if a contradiction is
not derivable, i.e., both Γ ⊢ φ and Γ ⊢ ¬φ are not derivable for any φ where we take the
conjunction of all sentences in Γ when it appears to the left of ⊢.
We use the standard semantics of first-order logic based on structures.11 A structure
is a tuple M , (D,Σ, J·K) where D is a (potentially empty) set called the domain, Σ is
a signature (the functions and relations of the language), and J·K is an interpretation of
the signature. Note that an empty domain cannot be used to interpret a language with
11. For more background on first-order logic, we refer the reader to (Hodges, 2001).
4
On Learning to Prove
constants. We say that a formula φ is satisfiable in a structure M if M  φ[ai1 , . . . , ain ]
for every ai1 , . . . , ain ∈ D where  is the usual satisfaction relation defined by induction on
the structure of formulas and we overload φ[ai1 , . . . , ain ] to mean that the interpretation of
the variable xim in φ[xi1 , . . . , xim , . . . , xin ] is aim . A sentence is satisfiable if there is some
structure M such that M  φ.
Recall that first-order logic with a standard proof system and standard semantics is
sound (i.e.,  φ if ⊢ φ) and complete (i.e., ⊢ φ if  φ). Thus a sentence φ is consistent iff it
is satisfiable. A sentence φ is inconsistent if it is satisfiable in no structures, consistent if it
is satisfiable in at least one structure, and logically valid if it is satisfiable in every structure.
We write φ1 ≡ φ2 when φ1 and φ2 are logically equivalent.
2.1.2 Graphs and trees
A directed graph is a tuple (V,E) where V is a set of vertices and E ⊆ {(v1, v2) | v1, v2 ∈ V }
is a set of edges. Because we only consider directed graphs in this paper, we will abbreviate
directed graph as graph. A path in a graph (V,E) is a graph (V ′, E′) of the form V ′ ,
{v1, . . . , vk} ⊆ V and E
′ , {(v1, v2), . . . , (vk−1, vk)} ⊆ E where all vi are distinct. We refer
to v1 and vk as the endpoints of the path.
A (rooted) tree is a tuple (V,E, vR) where (V,E) is a graph such that any two vertices
are connected by a unique path and vR ∈ V is a vertex designated as a root. Because there is
only one path between any two vertices, a path between v1 ∈ V and vk ∈ V can be identified
by the traversed vertices {v1, . . . , vk}, or simply the two endpoints v1 and vk. We say that
vp ∈ V is a parent of vc ∈ V , and vc is a child of vp, if there is a path {vR, . . . , vp, vc}.
We write child : V → Set(V ) so that child(v) obtains the set of children of v. if vc We
say that va ∈ V is an ancestor of vd ∈ V , and vd is a descendant of va, if there is a path
{vR, . . . , va, . . . , vd}. We write anc : V → Set(V ) so that anc(v) obtains the set of ancestors
of v (desc : V → Set(V ) for descendants).
2.2 Distributive Normal Forms: Intuition
The role of a dnf of a first-order formula is analogous to that of a disjunctive normal form
of a propositional formula in that the dnf of a formula is a disjunction of mutually exclusive
possibilities. That we can exhaustively describe mutually exclusive possibilities in the first-
order setting is not obvious as the domain of quantification can be infinite and individuals
in the domain can become related to one another as more individuals are considered. We
start with an example to illustrate the basic problem and solution due to Hintikka.
Consider a first-order theory with one binary predicate <, where x < y ,< (x, y) is infix
for “x is less than y”, for describing individuals and their order relations with one another.
We can look at what the normal form of the statement “every individual has an individual
that is smaller than it”, encoded in this language as
(∀x)(∃m)m < x
could be. Assuming that we have a constant that names each element in the domain of
quantification, a first attempt would be to translate each ∀ into a conjunction (over the
domain of individuals) and each ∃ into a disjunction (over the domain of individuals), and
use a propositional normal form. That is, we convert the result of translating the quantifiers
5
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away ∧
x
(∨
m
m < x
)
into disjunctive normal form. Unfortunately, the domain of quantification can be infinite,
so the resulting formula may be of infinite size. The “trick” for circumventing this is to
enumerate how the predicates at hand can describe the relationships between k individuals
(uniformly in k) instead of enumerating tuples of individuals. We can then identify possible
kinds of worlds by listing which kinds of individuals exist or not.
To see how this works, we rewrite the original statement as
¬(∃x)¬((∃m)(m < x)) .
(In words, it is impossible to find an individual that does not have an individual that is less
than it.) In this form, we can think of the normal form of a statement with quantification
as describing whether kinds of individuals with certain relations to one another exist or not.
In order to exhaust all the possibilities, we need to consider all the cases in which x and m
can related to one another that are consistent with the original formula.
We can see this better in our specific example by introducing notation that enumerates
all descriptions of one and two free individual variables describable by the predicate M .
When there is one free individual variable x1, the only possibility is to relate x1 to itself as
below
Pa1(x1) , (±)
a1(x1 < x1)
where a1 = 0 says that x1 is not less than itself and a1 = 1 says that x1 is less than itself.
When there are two free individual variables x1 and x2, we have
Qa1a2a3(x1, x2) , (±)
a1(x1 < x2) ∧ (±)
a2(x2 < x1) ∧ (±)
a3(x2 < x2)
where the subscript a1a2a3a4 indexes each Q. For example,
Q100(x1, x2) = x1 < x2 ∧ ¬(x2 < x1) ∧ ¬(x2 < x2) .
We enumerate all combinations of whether such individuals exist or not next.
δb1...b2512 ,
(±)b1 [(∃x1)P0(x1) ∧ ¬(∃x2)Q000(x1, x2) ∧ · · · ∧ ¬(∃x2)Q111(x1, x2)]∧
. . .∧
(±)b2256 [(∃x1)P0(x1) ∧ (∃x2)Q000(x1, x2) ∧ · · · ∧ (∃x2)Q111(x1, x2)]∧
(±)b2256+1 [(∃x1)P1(x1) ∧ ¬(∃x2)Q000(x1, x2) ∧ · · · ∧ ¬(∃x2)Q111(x1, x2)]∧
. . .∧
(±)b2512 [(∃x1)P1(x1) ∧ (∃x2)Q000(x1, x2) ∧ · · · ∧ (∃x2)Q111(x1, x2)]
The possible kinds of worlds described by our original formula is then any
δb1...b2512
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that implies the original formula. When we introduce dnfs more formally (Section 2.3), we
will see that the possible kinds of worlds are constituents.
The example deserves some remarks. First, note that we really have exhaustively enu-
merated all the mutually exclusive possibilities. The possibility δ0...0 describes one extreme
where there are no individuals (and hence the original statement is vacuously true),12 the
possibility δ
0...0b2256+1···2512
requires individuals to be less than themselves, and the possi-
bility δ1...1 enables every kind of individual to exist with respect to <. Second, note that
the number of possibilities even in this small example (two individuals and one predicate)
is enormous at 2512. The astronomical number of constituents is not an issue for theoret-
ical purposes although it does render the straightforward application of the theory to be
unfeasible.
2.3 Distributive Normal Forms: Background
Define the set
S({φ1, . . . , φk}) , {
∧
i∈{1,...,k}
(±)biφi | b1 ∈ 2, . . . , bk ∈ 2} .
An element of S({φ1, . . . , φk}) is a conjunction of every φi or its negation.
Let A[y1, . . . , yk] denote the set of all atomic formula (i.e., a predicate applied to a tuple
of terms) involving the free individual terms (i.e., constants or variables) y1, . . . , yk. Let
B[y1, . . . , yk] denote the subset of A[y1, . . . , yk] that mentions yk at least once.
Attributive constituents An attributive constituent with k free individual terms y1, . . . , yk
of depth 0 is an element of S(B[y1, . . . , yk]). We write Γ
(0)[y1, . . . , yk] , S(B[y1, . . . , yk]) for
the set of all attributive constituents with k free individual terms y1, . . . , yk of depth 0. By
convention, we set Γ(0)[] = {⊤}. An attributive constituent of depth 0 is a formula of the
form
γ(0)r [y1, . . . , yk] =
∧
i∈{1,...,ℓB
k
}
(±)biBi[y1, . . . , yk]
where ℓBk , |B[y1, . . . , yk]|, each bi ∈ 2, and each Bi[y1, . . . , yk] ∈ B[y1, . . . , yk]. The subscript
r indexes the attributive constituent and can be identified with the string b1 . . . bℓB
k
. Let
G0k , Str
ℓB
k (2) be an index set for attributive constituents with k free individual terms of
depth 0. We have G0k
∼= Γ(0)[y1, . . . , yk]. The superscript (0) indicates the depth of the
formula, i.e., the maximal number of nested quantifiers in the formula. Hence a depth of 0
indicates that there are no quantifiers.
The set of attributive constituents Γ(d)[y1, . . . , yk] of depth d > 0 is defined by induction
on d. More concretely, we have an attributive constituent with k free individual terms
12. Note that traditional presentations of first-order model theory disallow empty domains although this
restriction is not necessary. On the syntactic side, we will need to modify proof rules (e.g., the rule
(∀x) → (∃x) used in converting formula to prenex normal form no longer holds) to maintain soundness
and completeness.
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y1, . . . , yk of depth d > 0 has the form
γ(d)r,s [y1, . . . , yk] = γ
(0)
r [y1, . . . , yk]
∧


∧
r′∈G0
k+1
(±)s(r
′)(∃x)γ
(0)
r′ [y1, . . . , yk, x] d = 1∧
(r′,s′)∈Gd−1
k+1
(±)s(r
′,s′)(∃x)γ
(d−1)
r′,s′ [y1, . . . , yk, x] d > 1
where we will explain the undefined notation below. Let Gdk , G
0
k × (G
d−1
k+1 → 2)
∼=
Γ(d)[y1, . . . , yk] be an index set for attributive constituents of depth d > 0 with k free
individual terms y1, . . . , yk. The subscript (r, s) ∈ G
d
k is a pair of r ∈ G
0
k and a function
s : Gd−1k+1 → 2 indicating whether the appropriately indexed attributive constituent (of depth
d − 1 with k + 1 free individual terms) exists or not. When the indices do not matter, we
will abbreviate δ
(d)
r,s [y1, . . . , yk] as δ
(d)[y1, . . . , yk]. When we refer to two distinct attributive
constituents whose indices do not matter, we will overload the subscripts as in δ
(d)
i and δ
(d)
j
to distinguish them.
An attributive constituent with k free individual terms y1, . . . , yk of depth d ≥ 0 can
equivalently be defined as
γ(d)r,s [y1, . . . , yk] = γ
(0)
r [y1, . . . , yk] ∧
∧
(r′,s′)∈Gd−1
k+1 |
s
+
(∃x)γ
(d−1)
r′,s′ [y1, . . . , yk, x]
∧

(∀x) ∨
(r′,s′)∈Gd−1
k+1 |
s
+
γ
(d−1)
r′,s′ [y1, . . . , yk, x]


where Gdk |
s
+ , {(r
′, s′) | s(r′, s′) = 1} is the index set restricted to the positive ones as given
by the function s.
Constituents A constituent with k free individual terms y1, . . . , yk of depth d ≥ 0 is a
formula of the form
δ(d)q,r,s[y1, . . . , yk] = Aq[y1, . . . , yk−1] ∧ γ
(d)
r,s [y1, . . . , yk]
where Aq ∈ S(A[y1, . . . , yk]). Let ∆
(d)[y1, . . . , yk] be the set of constituents of depth d with
k free individual terms. By convention, we set ∆(0)[] = {⊤}. We write Ddk
∼= ∆(d)[y1, . . . , yk]
for the set indexing ∆(d)[y1, . . . , yk]. We use the same abbreviation scheme for the indices
of constituents as we did for attributive constituents. Note that a constituent is an at-
tributive constituent with an additional Aq[y1, . . . , yk−1]. Thus attributive constituents and
constituents can be identified when there are 0 free individual terms.
Distributive normal forms A distributive normal form (dnf) with k free individual
terms y1, . . . , yk is a disjunction of constituents∨
δ(d)[y1,...,yk]∈D
δ(d)[y1, . . . , yk]
for some subset D ⊆ ∆(d)[y1, . . . , yk] of constituents.
8
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Properties Attributive constituents, constituents, and dnfs have the following useful
properties (Hintikka, 1965).
Proposition 1 (Existence, mutual exclusion, and exclusivity)
Existence Every formula φ[y1, . . . , yk] (of depth d) has a distributive normal form (of depth
d), i.e., there is a function dnf : L[y1, . . . , yk]→ Set(∆
(d)[y1, . . . , yk]) such that
φ(d)[y1, . . . , yk] =
∨
δ(d)[y1,...,yk]∈dnf(φ[y1,...,yk])
δ(d)[y1, . . . , yk]
where L[y1, . . . , yk] is the set of well-formed first-order sentences with free individual
terms y1, . . . , yk.
Mutual exclusion Any two constituents and attributive constituents of the same depth
are mutually exclusive, i.e., δ
(d)
i =⇒ ¬δ
(d)
j for any δ
(d)
i 6= δ
(d)
j .
Expansion Every constituent δ(d)[y1, . . . , yk] can be written as a disjunction of its expan-
sion constituents, i.e., there is a function expand : N × ∆(d) → Set(∆(d+e)) such
that
δ(d)[y1, . . . , yk] ≡
∨
δ(d+e)[y1,...,yk]∈expand(e,δ(d)[y1,...,yk])
δ(d+e)[y1, . . . , yk] .
Any δ(d+e)[y1, . . . , yk] ∈ expand(e, δ
(d)[y1, . . . , yk]) is said to refine or is a refinement of
δ(d)[y1, . . . , yk].
13 We write δ(d)[y1, . . . , yk] ≤ δ
(d+e)[y1, . . . , yk] when δ
(d+e)[y1, . . . , yk] refines
δ(d)[y1, . . . , yk]. Let
∆[y1, . . . , yk] ,
⋃
d∈N
∆(d)[y1, . . . , yk] .
Then the refinement relation ≤: ∆[y1, . . . , yk] × ∆[y1, . . . , yk] → 2 is a partial order and
(∆[y1, . . . , yk],≥) is a poset.
It is well-known that validity of first-order formulas is undecidable. Consequently, the
consistency of constituents in a dnf is undecidable. There is a weaker notion called trivial
inconsistency that is decidable. There are several notions of trivial inconsistency (e.g., see
Hintikka, 1973; Nelte, 1997), although the exact form is not important for our purposes.
Proposition 2 (Completeness) An attributive constituent is inconsistent iff all of its
expansions at some depth are trivially inconsistent (Hintikka, 1965).
Thus, an inconsistency at depth d will eventually manifest itself as trivially inconsistent at
some depth e ≥ d, although the depth e is not recursively computable.14 The main idea is
show that a consistent attributive constituent always has an expansion that is not trivially
inconsistent; the result follows from an application of Ko˝nig’s tree lemma.
13. The original terminology that Hintikka uses is subordinate. We prefer the term refinement because it
evokes the intuition that δ(d+e)[y1, . . . , yk] ∈ expand(e, δ
(d)[y1, . . . , yk]) describes the possibility described
by δ(d)[y1, . . . , yk] in finer detail.
14. There are notions of trivial inconsistency that are not strong enough to ensure completeness as noted
by Nelte (1997).
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3. Representing Beliefs in Mathematical Knowledge
In this section, we introduce a representation that assigns probabilities to the exhaustive
and mutually exclusive possibilities of first-order logic that we have just seen to be con-
stituents. More concretely, we formalize a method for assigning weights to constituents
and an appropriate Bayesian update following the idea of assigning weights to constituents
described by Hintikka (1970, pg. 274–282) (Section 3.1). The representation induces a
probability distribution on the validity of first-order statements that does not enforce that
logically equivalent statements are assigned the same probability so that the beliefs of agents
that are not logically omniscient15 can be encoded (Section 3.2). At the end of the section,
we identify an embedding space—a Hilbert space—for first-order statements based on the
probabilistic representation where mutual exclusion in logic translates into orthogonality in
the space (Section 3.3).
Remark 3 (Simple first-order languages) For simplicity, we restrict attention to first-
order languages with a finite number of predicates, no function symbols, and no constants
unless stated otherwise.16 The constant-free restriction simplifies the form of constituents
and dnfs we will need to consider. As a reminder, every first-order formula φ[y1, . . . , yk]
with k free individual terms y1, . . . , yk has a dnf of depth d constituents. In a constant-free
setting, the free individual terms y1, . . . , yk are all variables. Thus the original formula
is equivalent to its universal closure (∀y1) . . . (∀yk)φ[y1, . . . , yk], which is a formula with 0
free individual terms (i.e., a sentence). Consequently, we only need to consider the set of
constituents ∆
(d)
0 [], abbreviated ∆
(d), of depth d with 0 free individual terms. We have that
∆(0) , {⊤} by convention.
3.1 Hintikka Trees
We formalize a representation that assigns probabilities to constituents in this section. As
the set of constituents at any depth exhaust and describe all mutually exclusive possibilities
at that depth, the idea behind the representation is the standard one: list all possibilities
and assign weights to them that sum to one. We construct the representation in two parts.
First, we introduce a refinement tree that keeps track of the refinement relation because
15. The problem of logical omniscience is an issue encountered in epistemic logic (e.g., see Sim, 1997;
Fagin et al., 2004; Halpern and Pucella, 2011) where we reason about the knowledge of agents. One
solution for weakening logical omniscience involves modeling impossible possible worlds, i.e., modeling
worlds that an agent considers possible but are eventually revealed to be impossible. Hintikka argues
that dnfs provide a model of impossible possible worlds—an impossible possible world is an inconsistent
constituent that is not trivially inconsistent at some depth and revealed to be trivially inconsistent at a
later depth (by completeness, Hintikka, 1979). Thus the application of dnfs to address the problem of
logical omniscience has also been hinted at by Hintikka.
16. As a reminder, the effect of equality is to give an exclusive interpretation of quantifiers. All the results
that hold on constituents in first-order logic without equality also hold on constituents in first-order logic
with equality with the appropriate modifications.
Note that functions can be encoded as predicates in first-order logic with equality.
Observe also that the current setting actually admits a finite number of constants. More concretely,
we can associate each constant c with a monadic predicate Pc where the interpretation of Pc(x) is “x is
the constant c”. Any formula φ[c] that refers to the constant c can thus be translated to (∃x)Pc(x)∧φ[x]
where x is not free in φ and we add the additional axiom (∃x)Pc(x) to the theory. Hence, we are roughly
working with first-order languages with a finite number of predicates, functions, and constants.
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δ
(0)
ǫ
δ
(1)
1
δ
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11
...
...
δ
(2)
1K2
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...
δ
(1)
K1
δ
(2)
K11
...
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δ
(2)
K1K3
...
...
. . .
. . . . . .
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Figure 1: A depiction of a refinement tree (∆, E). Each vertex represents a constituent and
each edge indicates a refinement relation. For example, the constituent δ
(2)
11 occurs
in the expansion of δ
(1)
1 . We assume that each constituent’s set of refinements is
an indexed set so that δ
(2)
11 indicates that we take the first refinement of δ
(0)
ǫ and
then take the first refinement of δ
(1)
1 .
constituents of different depths do not denote mutually exclusive possibilities when they are
related according to the refinement partial order (Section 3.1.1). Second, we describe how to
assign weights to the refinement tree which completes the static representation of an agent’s
beliefs (Section 3.1.2). After we introduce the representation, we introduce dynamics via a
renormalization operator which can be interpreted as a form of Bayesian update for beliefs
(Section 3.1.3).
3.1.1 Refinement tree
Let the set of vertices be the set of constituents of any depth ∆. Let the set of edges
ξ , {(δ(d), δ(d+1)) | δ(d) ≤ δ(d+1)} consist of the refinement relation omitting reflexive
relations. Then (∆, ξ) is a graph that encodes the refinement relation (minus the reflexive
edges).
The graph (∆, ξ) is not a tree because the expansions of two distinct constituents can
share refining constituents, although the shared constituents are necessarily inconsistent.
Proposition 4 Suppose δ
(d)
i 6= δ
(d)
j . If δ
(d+e) ∈ expand(e, δ
(d)
i )∩expand(e, δ
(d)
j ), then δ
(d+e)
is inconsistent.
Proof Assume additionally for the sake of contradiction that δ(d+e) is consistent. Then
there exists a structure M such that M  δ(d+e). Thus we have that M  δ
(d)
i and
M  δ
(d)
j (because δ
(d+e) ∈ expand(e, δ
(d)
i )∩ expand(e, δ
(d)
j ) by another assumption), which
contradicts that δ
(d)
i and δ
(d)
j are mutually incompatible (by exclusivity in Proposition 1).
By the proposition above, we can associate any shared constituent that is a refinement
of two parent constituents to either parent constituent and disassociate it with the other
11
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∆(1) ∆(2) ∆(3)
Figure 2: An illustration of the set of depth d = 1, 2, or 3 constituents (i.e., the universe of
possibilities by depth) where each cell corresponds to a constituent, the dimension
of the cell corresponds to the depth of the constituents, and the refinement relation
is encoded as projection. Cells colored light blue indicate that the associated
constituent is consistent and white cells indicate that the associated constituent
is inconsistent.
without changing the consistency of either parent constituent. In other words, we can
remove one edge. We can use this observation to convert (∆, ξ) into a tree. We call (∆, ξR)
a refinement tree where ξR is the set of edges obtained after the pruning procedure described
above is applied. Throughout the rest of this paper, we will assume that we have chosen
one such pruning and will write (∆, ξR) as (∆, ξ). We will also overload ≤ to refer to the
pruned refinement partial order. We have the following obvious relationships between the
(pruned) refinement partial order and (pruned) refinement tree.
Proposition 5
1. δ(d) ≤ δ(d+1) iff δ(d+1) ∈ child(δ(d)).
2. δ(d) ≤ δ(e) iff δ(d) = δ(e) or δ(d) ∈ anc(δ(e)) (equivalently δ(e) ∈ desc(δ(d))).
Proof Straightforward.
A path between constituents δ(d) and δ(d+e) is the sequence of constituents and their
refinements δ(d) ≤ δ(d+1) ≤ . . . ≤ δ(d+e). Because there is only one path between any two
vertices in a tree, we can identify a constituent (i.e., a node in a refinement tree) with the
path taken through a refinement tree starting at the root node δ(0) to reach it.
Figure 1 gives an illustration of a refinement tree where constituents are indexed by
their paths. The root constituent δ
(0)
ǫ of the tree is indexed by the empty path ǫ. Figure 2
gives another illustration of a refinement tree.
3.1.2 Assigning weights
We assign weights to constituents by attaching a weight to each node of the refinement
tree. Because the assignment of weights needs to respect the refinement partial order, we
12
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will need a notion of coherence between the weight assignments to adjacent levels of the
refinement tree.
Definition 6 A Hintikka tree (HT) is a tuple (∆, ξ,H) where (∆, ξ) is a refinement tree
and H : ∆→ [0, 1] is a function on constituents satisfying
Unitial initial beliefs H(δ(0)) = 1; and
Coherently constructed H(δ(d)) =
∑
δ(d+1)≥δ(d) H(δ
(d+1)).17
We will abbreviate a HT (∆, ξ,H) as H. We write HT(L) for the set of HTs defined with
respect to the the first-order simple language L.
The first condition states that we start off with unitial beliefs. The second condition enforces
that the probability that we assign a constituent δ(d) is contained entirely within the subtree
of the refinement tree rooted at δ(d). Hence the assignment of weights is conserved across
depth. Observe that the assignment of weights to constituents is not constrained by the
“fraction” of models that the constituents are satisfiable in. If it were, then the induced
distribution on the validity of first-order statements would enforce logical omniscience.
Proposition 7 (Normalization) The beliefs assigned to constituents at each depth d ∈ N
by a HT H are normalized: ∑
δ(d)∈∆(d)
H
d(δ(d)) = 1 .
Proof We proceed by induction on d. The base case follows from unitial initial beliefs. In
the inductive case, we have to show that∑
δ(d+1)∈∆(d+1)
H(δ(d+1)) = 1 .
We have that ∑
δ(d+1)∈∆(d+1)
H(δ(d+1)) =
∑
δ(d)∈∆(d)
∑
δ(d+1)≥δ(d)
H(δ(d+1))
=
∑
δ(d)∈∆(d)
H(δ(d))
where the first equality is a rearrangement and the second equality follows because H
is coherently constructed. The result follows as we have
∑
δ(d)∈∆(d) H(δ
(d)) = 1 by the
inductive hypothesis.
Proposition 8 (Infinite supported path) For any HT H, there is a chain of constituent
δ(0) ≤ δ(1) ≤ δ(2) ≤ . . . such that H(δ(d)) > 0 for any δ(d) in the chain.
17. The method of assigning weights in a HT is slightly different than the one described in prose by Hintikka
(1970, pg. 274–282). In particular, Hintikka combines the statics and dynamics of the weight assignment
whereas we separate them out and only describe the statics here. We will discuss the dynamics in
Section 3.1.3.
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H(δ
(0)
ǫ ) = 1
H(δ
(1)
a ) = 1/3
H(δ
(2)
c ) = 1/6
...
...
H(δ
(2)
d ) = 1/6
...
...
H(δ
(1)
b ) = 2/3
H(δ
(2)
e ) = 2/9
...
...
H(δ
(2)
f ) = 4/9
...
...
Figure 3: A drawing of an example Hintikka tree (HT). Vertices with 0 belief are not shown.
Each level of the HT is normalized. Moreover, the probability assigned each
subtree is conserved.
Proof We proceed by induction on d. The base case follows by unitial initial beliefs of
H. In the inductive case, we have that H(δ(d)) > 0. The result follows as H is coher-
ently constructed and δ(d) has a finite number of children so there must exist a refinement
δ(d+1) ≥ δ(d) such that H(δ(d+1)) > 0.
We end with several examples of HTs.
Example 1 Figure 3 gives an illustration of an example HT. As required by the definition,
beliefs across depth are coherent.
Example 2 A HT is an uninformative Hintikka tree if H is a uniform distribution at every
depth, i.e., H(δ(d)) = 1/|∆(d)| for any δ(d) ∈ ∆(d).
Example 3 A HT is a depth Hintikka tree if H is constrained so that inconsistent con-
stituents are assigned 0.18 Inconsistency is undecidable so that a depth HT is not com-
putable. If a theorem proving agent represents mathematical knowledge with a depth HT,
then the agent is logically omniscient. We have that  φ(d) iff
∑
δ(d)∈dnf(φ(d))H(δ
(d)) = 1 for
some depth HT H.
A HT provides a static representation of an agent’s beliefs. Naturally, an agent may
encounter a situation where it realizes that its beliefs need to be revised. For example, upon
further inspection of all the expansions of a parent constituent, the agent may realize that
they are all inconsistent so the belief in the parent constituent should be eliminated and
redistributed to other constituents. Intuitively, this may occur because the increase in depth
18. The terminology is inspired by depth information (Hintikka, 1970). Observe that there are consis-
tent constituents at every depth and that consistent constituents have consistent refinements by the
constituent completeness theorem so that a depth HT is well-defined. For example, the sentence
((∃x1) . . . (∃xd)φ[x1, . . . , xd]) ∨ ¬((∃x1) . . . (∃xd)φ[x1, . . . , xd]) is logically valid at depth d.
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corresponds to the construction of an object (i.e., an introduction of an existential) and
the consideration of this extra object changes the valuation of the consistency of the parent
possibility. Indeed, such a situation arises from the constituent completeness theorem:
inconsistent constituents are eventually revealed to be trivially inconsistent at some depth
even if they are not trivially inconsistent at shallower depths. We turn our attention to the
dynamics of belief revision in the representation now.
3.1.3 Renormalization dynamics
Hintikka (1970, pg. 281) describes a method of redistributing weights assigned to a refine-
ment tree when belief in a node and all of its descendants is lost. The intuition for the
update follows Bayesian “refute” and “rescale” dynamics: when belief in a node and all
of its descendants is eliminated so that those possibilities are “refuted”, the beliefs in the
smallest subtree containing that node that still has positive weight are “rescaled” appropri-
ately. In this section, we formalize this intuition as a renormalization operation. Towards
this end, we will specify (1) which constituents to redistribute beliefs to and (2) the amount
of belief to redistribute to those constituents.
Part one of renormalization We start with the first task and begin by identifying
which constituents to redistribute beliefs to when we discontinue beliefs in δ
(d)
− in a HT
H. Define the function supp0
H,δ
(d)
−
: ∆ → 2 as (1) supp0
H,δ
(d)
−
(δ(e)) = ⊤ if there is some
δ(e) ≤ δ(e+1) ≤ . . . ≤ δ(d) such that H(δ(n)) > 0 for e ≤ n ≤ d and δ(d) 6= δ
(d)
− and (2)
supp0
H,δ
(d)
−
(δ(e)) = ⊥ otherwise. Define the support function supp : ∆→ 2 as
supp
H,δ
(d)
−
(δ(e)) ,


⊥ δ(e) ≥ δ
(d)
−
supp0
H,δ
(d)
−
(δ(e)) otherwise.
The idea is that we will transfer beliefs assigned to unsupported constituents over to
the appropriate supported constituents. Define the abbreviations S+
H,δ
(d)
−
, {δ(e) ∈ ∆ |
supp
H,δ
(d)
−
(δ(e)) = ⊤} and S−
H,δ
(d)
−
, ∆\S+S . Thus S
−
H,δ
(d)
−
and S+
H,δ
(d)
−
partition ∆. Define a
d-redistribution point as
ρ
H,δ
(d)
−
, max
0≤r≤d
{δ(r) | δ(r) ≤ δ(d), δ(r) ∈ S+
H,δ
(d)
−
} ,
which is the closest (i.e., deepest by depth) ancestor constituent that has supported descen-
dants. A d-redistribution point identifies a vertex of the refinement tree that has supported
descendants to redistribute beliefs in unsupported constituents to.
Part two of renormalization We turn our attention towards the second task concerning
the amount of belief to redistribute to each constituent now. Let D+
H,δ
(d)
−
, child(ρ
H,δ
(d)
−
) ∩
S+
H,δ
(d)
−
be the children of ρ
H,δ
(d)
−
that are supported. Then
Z+
H,δ
(d)
−
,
∑
δ(e)∈D+
H,δ
(d)
−
H(δ(e))
15
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H(δ) = a+ b+ c+ d
H(δl) = a+ b+ c
H(δll) = a
H(δlll) = a
H(δlr) = b+ c
H(δlrl) = b H(δlrr) = c
H(δr) = d
H(δrl) = d
H(δrll) = d
H(δ) = a+ b+ c+ d
H(δl) = a+ b+ c
H(δlr) = a+ b+ c
H(δlrl) =
ab
b+c
H(δlrr) =
ac
b+c
H(δr) = d
H(δrl) = d
H(δrll) = d
before renormδlll(H) after renormδlll(H)
Figure 4: An example of renormalization. We assume that the constituent δ appears some-
where in the refinement tree. The left shows a H before renormalization by δlll.
The constituent δl is the d-renormalization point ρH,δlll as it is the closest ancestor
that has descendants that are supported through depth d. After renormalization
on the right, the weight a in the eliminated region (constituents δll and δlll) are
transferred to the closest region that is still supported (constituents δlr, δlrl, and
δlrr) in proportion to the existing weights.
is the positive renormalization constant and
Z
H,δ
(d)
−
,
∑
δ(e)∈child(ρ
H,δ
(d)
−
)
H(δ(e))
is the total renormalization constant.
Renormalization We arrive at the definition of renormalization by putting the two parts
together.
Definition 9 The renormalization of H with respect to δ
(d)
− is a function renormδ(d)−
: (∆→
2)→ ∆→ [0, 1] defined as
renorm
δ
(d)
−
(H)(δ(e)) =


Z
H,δ
(d)
−
Z+
H,δ
(d)
−
H(δ(e)) δ(e) ∈ desc(ρ
H,δ
(d)
−
) ∩ S+
H,δ
(d)
−
0 δ(e) ∈ desc(ρ
H,δ
(d)
−
) ∩ S−
H,δ
(d)
−
H(δ(e)) otherwise
when Z+
H,δ
(d)
−
> 0 and undefined otherwise.19
19. Hintikka (1970, pg. 281) devotes one paragraph to describing renormalization. The definition of renor-
malization given here translates that description into mathematical language as well as explicitly makes
the connection between the redistribution of weights for unsupported constituents and Bayesian update.
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Figure 5: An illustration that shows how renormalization affects example beliefs. When
transitioning from depth 1 to depth 2, δ
(1)
b becomes an unsupported constituent
so δ
(0)
ǫ is a 1-renormalization point as it is the closest constituent with supported
descendants at depth 2. The 1/3 belief assigned to δ
(1)
b is redistributed according
to Bayes rule across the 1-renormalization point’s descendants at depth 2 (i.e., δ
(1)
a
and δ
(1)
c ). Thus H1 = renormδ(1)
b
(H0). When transitioning from depth 2 to depth
3, δ
(1)
ad and δ
(1)
ce become unsupported constituents, so δ
(0)
ǫ is a 2-renormalization
point. Thus H2 = renorm
δ
(2)
ad
◦ renorm
δ
(2)
ce
(H1).
Observe that renorm
δ
(d)
−
(H) only affects the descendants of ρ
H,δ
(d)
−
: renorm
δ
(d)
−
(H)(δ(e)) =
H(δ(e)) for δ(e) /∈ desc(ρ
H,δ
(d)
−
). Figure 4 provides an illustration of the renormalization
process.
Renormalization of HTs have the following properties.
Proposition 10 Suppose H is a HT. Then the following holds:
Coherence renorm
δ
(d)
−
(H) is coherently constructed provided there is some δ(d) 6= δ
(d)
− such
that H(δ(d)) > 0;
Preservation
H(ρ
H,δ
(d)
−
) =
∑
δ(r+e)∈expand(e,ρ
H,δ
(d)
−
)
renorm
δ
(d)
−
(H)(δ(r+e)) .
; and
Commutative renorm
δ
(d)
2
◦ renorm
δ
(d)
1
(H) = renorm
δ
(d)
1
◦ renorm
δ
(d)
2
(H) provided there is
some δ(d) 6= δ
(d)
1 and δ
(d) 6= δ
(d)
2 such that H(δ
(d)) > 0.
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Proof See Section 3.4 as the proof is straightforward but tedious.
The coherence property indicates that renormalization is appropriately defined. Preserva-
tion localizes the renormalization to the descendants of a d-renormalization point. Commu-
tativity of renormalization means that the order in which we renormalize does not matter
and can be interpreted as exchangeability. We write renormT d , renormδ(d)n
◦ · · ·◦renorm
δ
(d)
1
for any T d = {δ
(d)
1 , . . . , δ
(d)
n }. Figure 5 illustrates how renormalization affects example be-
liefs.
A process for converging to a depth HT Although a depth HT is not computable,
there is a process of converting a reasonable HT into a depth HT via a sequence of renor-
malizations. Intuitively, we will obtain a depth HT after we refute every inconsistent con-
stituent. We formalize this process now.
We say that a HT H is reasonable ifH(δ(d)) > 0 whenever δ(d) is not trivially inconsistent.
Put another way, a HT is reasonable if an agent does not assign zero probability to a
constituent that it cannot refute using a test for trivial inconsistency.
Example 4 Both an uninformative HT and a depth HT are reasonable.
Let ∆
(d)
− be the set of depth d constituents that are trivially inconsistent. Define a
sequence of HTs (Hd)d∈N inductively as
H
1 , renorm
∆
(1)
−
(H0)
H
d+1 , renorm
∆
(d+1)
−
(Hd)
(1)
where H0 is some initial HT. Recall that there are consistent constituents at every depth and
that constituent constituents have consistent expansions by the constituent completeness
theorem so that the sequence of renormalizations is well-defined (see Footnote 18). The
idea is that limd→∞H
d converges to a depth HT.
First, we check that renormalization results in a reasonable HT.
Proposition 11 Let H be a reasonable HT. Then
1. renormδ(d)(H) is reasonable when δ
(d) ∈ ∆
(d)
− ;
2. renorm∆(d)(H) is reasonable; and
3. each Hd in the sequence (Hd)d∈N is reasonable.
Proof
1. We check that δ(e) > 0 whenever δ(e) is not trivially inconsistent. The result follows
by a straightforward case analysis on whether δ(e) ∈ desc(ρ
H,δ
(d)
−
), δ(e) ∈ anc(ρ
H,δ
(d)
−
),
or δ(e) = ρ
H,δ
(d)
−
.
2. The result follows by |∆
(d)
− | applications of Proposition 11, item 1.
3. By induction on d.
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Second, we check that the limit exists. Roughly speaking, the limit exists because of
Bayesian refute and rescale dynamics: either belief in a constituent is refuted and belief in
all of its refinements converges to zero or the belief in a constituent is rescaled by belief lost
in refuted constituents so that belief in all of its refinements is a monotonically increasing
and bounded sequence. We say that δ(d) is eventually unsupported with respect to H if
there exists an e ∈ N such that all of its depth d+ e expansions δ(d+e) have H(δ(d+e)) = 0.
We say that δ(d) is always supported otherwise.
Proposition 12 Let (Hd)d∈N be a sequence of HTs defined as in Equation 1 where H
0 is
a reasonable HT. Then
1. lime→∞H
e(δ(d)) = 0 when δ(d) is eventually unsupported with respect to some HE in
the sequence; and
2. δ(d) is eventually unsupported with respect to some HE in the sequence iff it is incon-
sistent; and
3. (He(δ(d)))e∈N is a monotonically increasing sequence bounded by 1 when δ
(d) is always
supported so that lime→∞H
e(δ(d)) exists; and
4.
lim
e→∞
H
e(δ(d)) =
∑
δ(d+1)≥δ(d)
lim
e→∞
H
e(δ(d+1)) .
Proof
1. If δ(d) is eventually unsupported, then there is an E ∈ N such that
H
E(δ(d)) = 0 .
Moreover He(δ(d)) = 0 for any e ≥ E as renormalization cannot rescale a probability
0 assignment. Hence the series converges and is 0.
2. In the forward direction, we have that there is some E ∈ N such that HE(δ(d)) = 0
whenever δ(d) is eventually unsupported by the above. Moreover HE is reasonable
by Proposition 11 so δ(d) is trivially inconsistent. The forward direction follows as a
constituent is inconsistent if it is trivially inconsistent.
In the reverse direction, we have that there is some depth E ∈ N such that all of the
refinements of δ(d) are trivially inconsistent at depth E by the constituent completeness
theorem. Thus HE(δ(d)) = 0 as HE is reasonable by Proposition 11 and the result
follows.
3. Observe that He(δ(d)) ≤ He+1(δ(d)) by the preservation property of renormalization
(Proposition 10) when δ(d) is always supported. That we have a monotonically in-
creasing sequence follows by induction on e. The sequence is bounded by 1 because a
HT is normalized at every depth. Thus the limit exists.
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4. We have
lim
e→∞
H
e(δ(d)) = lim
e→∞
∑
δ(d+1)≥δ(d)
H
e(δ(d+1))
=
∑
δ(d+1)≥δ(d)
lim
e→∞
H
e(δ(d+1))
where the first equality follows by definition and the second equality follows because
the sequence is dominated by 1 (by items 1 and 3).
We can show the desired result now.
Proposition 13 limd→∞H
d exists and is a depth HT when H0 is a reasonable HT.20
Proof We have that H∞ , limd→∞H
d exists by Proposition 12, items 1 and 3. Next,
we check that H∞ is a HT. We clearly have that H∞ satisfies unitial initial beliefs. We
have that H∞ is coherently constructed by Proposition 12 item 4. Finally, observe that
lime→∞H
e(δ(d)) = 0 iff δ(d) is inconsistent. Finally, observe that δ(d) is eventually unsup-
ported iff it is inconsistent by Proposition 12, item 2. Thus H∞ is a depth HT.
3.2 Probabilities on First-Order Sentences
As every depth d first-order sentence can be written as a depth d dnf, a HT induces a
probability distribution on the validity of first-order sentences. Notably, the distribution
does not enforce that logically equivalent statements are assigned the same probability.
This means that we can represent the beliefs of an agent that is not logically omniscient.
Although logical omniscience fails, the induced distribution does not assign probabilities to
logically related sentences arbitrarily.
We begin by defining a topology21 on the refinement tree. Let Ψd , {δ(0) . . . δ(d) | δ(0) ≤
. . . ≤ δ(d)} be the set of length d paths of the refinement tree. Let Ψω , {δ(0)δ(1) . . . | δ(0) ≤
δ(1) ≤ . . . } be the set of infinite paths of the refinement tree. We write δ(0) ≤ . . . ≤ δ(d) ⊑ ρ
if δ(0) ≤ . . . ≤ δ(d) appears as a finite prefix of ρ ∈ Ψω. Let Ψω
δ(d)
, {δ(d+1)δ(d+2) . . . | δ(d) ≤
δ(d+1) ≤ δ(d+2) ≤ . . . } be the set of infinite paths of the refinement tree starting with a
refinement of δ(d). Define the topological space (Ψω,O) where O is a topology generated
by the basis of open sets
B , {δ(0) . . . δ(d)Ψω
δ(d)
| δ(0) . . . δ(d) ∈ Ψd} ∪ {∅} .
Each basic open δ(0) . . . δ(d)Ψω
δ(d)
contains every infinite refinement path that begins with
δ(0) . . . δ(d) ∈ Ψd.
20. Hintikka (1970) gives an analogous result where depth information (i.e., a depth HT) is the limit of
surface information (i.e., the limit of propagating trivial inconsistency via renormalization).
21. For background on topology, we refer the reader to (Munkres, 2000).
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Definition 14 The belief BB : B → [0, 1] in a basic open δ
(0) . . . δ(d)Ψω
δ(d)
∈ B with respect
to a HT H is defined as
BB(δ
(0) . . . δ(d)Ψω
δ(d)
) , H(δ(d))
BB(∅) , 0 .
Proposition 15 The basic opens have consistent assignments:
BB(δ
(0) . . . δ(d)Ψω
δ(d)
) =
∑
δ(d+1)≥δ(d)
BB(δ
(0) . . . δ(d)δ(d+1)Ψω
δ(d+1)
) .
Proof This follows directly from the fact that H is coherently constructed.
Thus we have a finitely additive set function. It is easy to see that BB(Ψ
ω) = 1.
We extend the belief in a basic open to the measurable space22 (Ψω, σ(O)) where σ(O)
is the Borel σ-algebra obtained in the standard way.
Proposition 16 The belief BB in a basic open defines a unique probability measure β on
the measurable space (Ψω, σ(O)).
Proof Observe that (Ψω,O) has a countable basis B so that the Borel σ-algebra is generated
by the basis B. Moreover, the basis B is a π-system (i.e., closed under finite intersections).
The result follows as a finitely additive set function on a π-system (Proposition 3.2) can be
uniquely extended to a set function on a σ-algebra when it is σ-finite.
Finally, we define a distribution on first-order sentences.
Definition 17 The belief in the validity of first-order sentences is given by
B(φ(d)) ,
∑
δ(d)∈dnf(φ(d))
β(δ(0) . . . δ(d)Ψω
δ(d)
)
where β is the probability measure obtained from BB.
The belief in a first-order formula of depth d with k free variables is the (d + k)-belief in
the closed first-order formula obtained via universal closure (which increases the depth to
d+ k).
We check that there are HTs that induce probability distributions that do not enforce
logical omniscience.
Proposition 18 (Failure of logical omniscience) There is a HT H such that φ1 ≡ φ2
but B(φ1) 6= B(φ2)
Proof Let H be an uninformative HT. Pick any two inconsistent constituents δ
(d)
1 and δ
(d)
2 .
Then δ
(d)
1 ≡ δ
(d)
1 ∧ δ
(d)
2 but B(δ
(d)
1 ) 6= B(δ
(d)
1 ∧ δ
(d)
2 ).
Although logical omniscience fails, we cannot assign probabilities arbitrarily. The fol-
lowing proposition highlights some constraints on the probability assignments.
22. For background on measure-theoretic probability, we refer the reader to (Kallenberg, 2006).
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Proposition 19 The probability on first-order sentences has the following properties:
1. B(¬φ) = 1− B(φ);
2. B(φ1 ∧ φ2) ≤ min(B(φ1),B(φ2));
3. max(B(φ1),B(φ2)) ≤ B(φ1 ∨ φ2);
4.
B((∀x)φ) ≤ min
δ∈dnf((∃x)¬φ)
{1− B(δ)}) ; and
5.
max
δ∈dnf((∃x)φ)
{B(δ)} ≤ B((∃x)φ) .
Proof These all follow from set-theoretic manipulations.
For the case of universal and existential quantification, the minimum and maximum are
taken over constituents, i.e., possible kinds of individuals, as opposed to individuals in
the domain of quantification. Note that this differs with the Gaifman condition (e.g., see
Gaifman, 1964) which defines the probability of a universal or existential as the infimum or
supremum over individuals in the domain.
The beliefs possessed by a logically omniscient agent are not computable, and assign
probability one to logically valid statements and probability zero to logically invalid state-
ment.
Proposition 20
1. The beliefs with respect to a depth HT satisfy B(φ) = 1 when  φ and B(φ) = 0 when
2 φ.
2. Depth beliefs are not computable.
Proof
1. When 2 φ(d), then the dnf of φ(d) contains only inconsistent constituents so that
B(φ(d)) = 0. To see that B(φ(d)) = 1 when  φ(d), recall a formula φ(d) is logically
valid iff its dnf contains all consistent constituents at depth d. By the normalization
property of a HT, we have that the
∑
δ(d) consistentH(δ
(d)) = 1 so that B(φ(d)) = 1
when  φ(d) as required.
2. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that depth beliefs are computable. As a con-
stituent is eventually unsupported if it is inconsistent and always supported if it is
consistent, we thus have a decision procedure for validity of first-order logic, a con-
tradiction.
3.3 An Embedding Space for First-Order Logic
In this section, we embed first-order statements into an associated Hilbert space where
mutual exclusion in logic appears as orthogonality in the space. Once we embed first-order
statements, we will be able to relate certain logical operations on sentences with operators
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δ
(d)
i
δ
(d)
j
δ
(d)
k
(0.2, 0, 0) (0, 0.3, 0)
(0, 0, 0.4)
Figure 6: An illustration of the embedding of dnf(δ(d)) = δ
(d)
i ∨ δ
(d)
j ∨ δ
(d)
j where we restrict
attention to sentences of depth d or less and we have β(δ(0) . . . δ
(d)
i Ψ
ω
δ
(d)
i
) = 0.2,
β(δ(0) . . . δ
(d)
j Ψ
ω
δ
(d)
j
) = 0.3, and β(δ(0) . . . δ
(d)
k Ψ
ω
δ
(d)
k
) = 0.4. Observe that B(φ(d)) =
0.8 so that φ(d) is an independent statement with respect to our current beliefs
B.
in the space. As some probabilistic operations can be interpreted as operators, we will also
obtain probabilistic analogues of logical operations.
The Hilbert space we choose for the embedding is the standard one obtained by consider-
ing square integrable functions over a measurable space.23 Let L2(Ψω, β) be the (weighted)
L2 space associated with the probability space (Ψω, σ(O), β).
Definition 21 We have that L2(Ψω, β) is the Hilbert space associated with β where the
inner product 〈·, ·〉 : L2(Ψω, β)× L2(Ψω, β)→ R is given by
〈f, g〉 =
∫
f · g¯ dβ
for f, g ∈ L2(Ψω, β) (i.e., f and g are square integrable) and g¯ denotes the complex
conjugate.24 As usual, the inner product induces a norm ‖·‖ : L2(Ψω, β) → R where
‖f‖ =
√
〈f, f〉.
As notation, we will overload normal arithmetic operations on numbers to mean their
pointwise counterparts on functions. For example, f + g , x 7→ f(x) + g(x). We use the
infix operator ⊕ to take the maximum of two functions: f ⊕ g , x 7→ max(f(x), g(x)).
Similarly, we use the infix operator ⊖ to take the minimum of two functions: f ⊖ g , x 7→
min(f(x), g(x)).
We embed first-order statements into L2(Ψω, β) using the intuition that every first-order
statement can be written as a finite disjunction of constituents, i.e., mutually exclusive or
“orthogonal” possibilities.
23. For more background on functional analysis, we refer the reader to (Bachman and Narici, 2000).
24. Because the codomain is R in our case, the complex conjugate acts as an identity.
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Definition 22 Define an embedding into L2(Ψω, β) as
φ(d) 7→
∑
δ(d)∈dnf(φ(d))
χδ(0)...δ(d)Ψω
δ(d)
(·)
where χX(·) is the characteristic function over the set X. We write the corresponding
element of φ(d) ∈ L as φ(d) ∈ L2(Ψω, β).
When we consider sentences with maximum depth D, then each
1√
β(δ(0) . . . δ(D)Ψω
δ(D)
)
χδ(0)...δ(D)Ψω
δ(D)
(·)
is a basis vector when β(δ(0) . . . δ(D)Ψω
δ(D)
) > 0. Indeed, we can interpret the fact that every
first-order sentence φ(d) of depth d ≤ D can be written as a dnf as the analog of the fact
that every vector in a finite-dimensional vector space can be written as a (finite) linear
combination of basis vectors. Figure 6 gives an illustration of an example embedding.
Because we have an embedding of first-order sentences into L2(Ψω, β) and Hilbert spaces
admit complete orthonormal sets A, we can also write every first-order sentence as a sum
of elements from A. We can think of A as an orthogonal “basis” for first-order logic.
Proposition 23 Let A be a complete orthonormal set for L2(Ψω, β). Then |A| is either
(1) finite or (2) countable depending on the distribution β.
Proof A can be finite-dimensional when β has a finite number of atoms that contain
probability 1. In particular, the finite collection of characteristic functions supported on
those atoms forms a basis. To see that |A| can be countable, observe that there is a
measure preserving bijection up to measure zero between Ψω and [0, 1]. The result follows
as L2([0, 1], β) admits a countable complete orthonormal set.
In the rest of this section, we will only consider L2(Ψω, β) where β is reasonable, i.e., when
β is derived from a reasonable HT H.
Proposition 24 The embedding has the following properties.
Negation as orthogonality We have 〈φ,¬φ〉 = 0.
Or as maximum We have that φ1 ∨ φ2 = φ1 ⊕ φ2 for any f, g ∈ L
2(Ψω, β).
Orthogonality implies mutual exclusion If 〈φ1,φ2〉 = 0 then φ1 =⇒ ¬φ2 for any
sentences φ1 and φ2.
Proof
Negation as orthogonality The dnfs of φ and ¬φ are disjoint. Thus φ and ¬φ are
supported on disjoint sets so that the inner product is 0.
Or as maximum Let φ
(d1)
1 and φ
(d2)
2 and d = max(d1, d2). The result follows by case
analysis on whether δ(d) ∈ dnf(δ
(d1)
1 ) ∩ dnf(δ
(d2)
2 ) or not.
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Orthogonality implies mutual exclusion Let φ
(d1)
1 and φ
(d2)
2 be any two sentences such
that 〈φ
(d1)
1 ,φ
(d2)
2 〉 = 0. Let d = max(d1, d2). For any
δ(d) ∈ expand(d− d1,dnf(φ
(d1)
1 )∩ expand(d− d2,dnf(φ
(d2)
2 )) ,
we have that β(δ(0) . . . δ(d)Ψω
δ(d)
) = 0. We conclude that δ(d) is inconsistent as β is
reasonable. The result follows as the other constituents are mutually exclusive.
These properties deserve some remarks. The first item shows that a formula and its negation
are orthogonal in L2(Ψω, β). The second item generalizes the first item and shows that
orthogonal elements of L2(Ψω, β) denote possibilities that are logically mutually exclusive.
The converse is true when we consider constituents. The third item shows that logical or
(unsurprisingly) acts as a maximum (i.e., a join).
We note that quantification has no effect on the Hilbert space representation. For
instance, suppose we take a depth d sentence φ(d) and introduce a quantifier as to obtain
a depth d + 1 sentence (e.g., by replacing a duplicated mention of a variable with a new
quantifier). This corresponds to restricting attention to the subspace of L2(Ψω, β) spanned
by
{δ(d+1) | δ(d+1) ∈ dnf(expand(1, φ(d)))} ,
which is exactly the subspace we would look at when considering the validity of φ(d). A
similar situation occurs when we eliminate a quantifier (e.g., by eliminating all mentions of
a quantified variable with some other quantified variable).
We consider some elementary interactions between probability and first-order logic using
the interpretation of probabilistic operations as operators. In particular, we will be able to
analyze the relationship between conditioning and implication.
Correlation The correlation ρφ1,φ2 between two sentences φ1 and φ2 is given as
ρφ1,φ2 ,
〈φ1 − β(φ1),φ2 − β(φ2)〉√
β(φ1)(1− β(φ1))β(φ2)(1 − β(φ2))
when β(φ1) 6= 0 or 1 and β(φ2) 6= 0 or 1. Thus the correlation between two statements
is defined only when we believe them to be independent. As usual, we can interpret the
correlation between φ1 and φ2 as the cosine of the angle between φ1 and φ2.
Conditioning The conditional expectation of φ2 with respect to φ1, written E[φ2 | φ1],
is any φ1-measurable function such that∫
φ1
E[φ2 | φ1] dβ =
∫
φ1
φ2 dβ .
As usual, we can interpret conditioning φ2 on φ1 as the projection of φ2 onto φ1. Observe
that E[φ2 | φ1] can be any function when φ1 is inconsistent (i.e., φ1 = 0) and β is a depth
HT. In logical terms, we have that a contradiction implies any statement. We consider the
interaction between conditioning and implication next.
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Implication As researchers have noted for a long time in the setting of propositional
logic, the probability of the implication φ1 → φ2 is not the same as its corresponding
conditional expectation E[φ2 | φ1] (e.g., see Dubois and Prade, 1990). The reason given in
the propositional setting is that φ1 → φ2 ≡ ¬φ1 ∨ φ2 computes the union of areas whereas
conditional probability computes a ratio of areas (when it exists) so that the two concepts
are different. From the perspective of L2(Ψω, β), we can (somewhat awkwardly) connect
the two concepts. As a reminder, we have that
φ1 → φ2 = ¬φ1 ⊕ φ2 .
We can rewrite this to use conditional expectations as
φ1 → φ2 =
‖¬φ1‖
‖E[φ2 | ¬φ1]‖
E[φ2 | ¬φ1]⊕
‖φ2‖
‖E[¬φ1 | φ2]‖
E[¬φ1 | φ2] .
Observe that we rewrite ¬φ1 as the rescaled orthogonal projection of φ2 onto ¬φ1. (Sim-
ilarly, we rewrite φ2 as the rescaled orthogonal projection of ¬φ1 onto φ2.) Thus there
is a relationship between implication and conditioning although it is not the one we might
expect it to be.
Remark 25 (An embedding space for first-order logic) From the perspective of ma-
chine learning, we can also think of L2(Ψω, β) as a natural embedding space for representing
first-order logic similar to how Rd has proved to be a useful embedding space for representing
natural language (e.g., see Mikolov et al., 2013). In the setting of natural language process-
ing, there are empirical results suggesting that the operations of vector addition and vector
subtractions can be used to add and subtract semantic content from word embeddings. In
the logical setting, adding a concept encoded by φ2 to a concept encoded by φ1 corresponds
to embedding φ1 ∨ φ2. Thus we take their maximum as opposed to performing an addition
in L2(Ψω, β).
Suppose we want to subtract a concept φ2 from φ1. Logically, we would encode this as
φ1 − φ2 , φ1 ∧¬φ2. Then subtraction of semantic content has the following interpretation:
φ1− φ2 = φ1 ⊖¬φ2 .
Thus we do not perform the analogous subtraction in L2(Ψω, β).
It would be an interesting direction of future work to examine more in depth what can
be said about first-order logic from the viewpoint of L2(Ψω, β). For instance, are there in-
teresting complete orthonormal sets for first-order sentences and what do the corresponding
coefficients look like? For now, we simply note that one can embed first-order logic into a
Hilbert space. It is not clear to us whether such an embedding is useful although we do
think it intriguing that such an embedding exists.
3.4 Supplementary on Renormalization
This section contains the supplementary proof for the properties of renormalization (Propo-
sition 10).
Proof
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Coherence We show this by case analysis on whether δ(e) ∈ desc(ρ
H,δ
(d)
−
) or δ(e) /∈ desc(ρ
H,δ
(d)
−
).
Suppose δ(e) ∈ desc(ρ
H,δ
(d)
−
). We have to show that
renorm
δ
(d)
−
(H)(δ(e)) =
∑
δ(e+1)≥δ(e)
renorm
δ
(d)
−
(H)(δ(e+1)) .
We proceed by case analysis on whether δ(e) ∈ S−
H,δ
(d)
−
or δ(e) ∈ S+
H,δ
(d)
−
.
In case of the former, we have that renorm
δ
(d)
−
(H)(δ(e)) = 0 and∑
δ(e+1)≥δ(e)
renorm
δ
(d)
−
(H)(δ(e+1)) = 0
as required.
In case of the latter, we have that renorm
δ
(d)
−
(H)(δ(e)) = 0 and
∑
δ(e+1)≥δ(e)
renorm
δ
(d)
−
(H)(δ(e+1)) =
Z
H,δ
(d)
−
Z+
H,δ
(d)
−
∑
δ(e+1)≥δ(e)
H(δ(e))
by rearranging (We need the hypothesis that there is at least one supported con-
stituent, otherwise we divide by zero). The result follows by the coherence of H.
Suppose δ(e) /∈ desc(ρ
H,δ
(d)
−
). The only non-trivial case occurs when δ(e) = ρ
H,δ
(d)
−
. We
have ∑
δ(e+1)≥δ(e)
renorm
δ
(d)
−
(H)(δ(e+1)) =
Z
H,δ
(d)
−
Z+
H,δ
(d)
−
∑
δ(e+1)∈child(δ(e))∩S+
H,δ
(d)
−
H(δ(e))
by substituting definitions. The result follows by observing that∑
δ(e+1)∈child(δ(e))∩S+
δ
(d)
−
H(δ(e))
is exactly Z+
δ
(d)
−
so the result follows.
Preservation By induction on e. The base case is trivial. In the inductive case, we have
to show that
H(ρ
H,δ
(d)
−
) =
∑
δ(r+e+1)∈expand(e+1,ρ
H,δ
(d)
−
)
renorm
δ
(d)
−
(H)(δ(r+e+1)) .
Rewriting the right hand side, we obtain∑
δ(r+e)∈expand(e,ρ
H,δ
(d)
−
)
∑
δ(r+e+1)≥δ(r+e)
renorm
δ
(d)
−
(H)(δ(r+e+1))
=
∑
δ(r+e)∈expand(e,ρ
H,δ
(d)
−
)
renorm
δ
(d)
−
(H)(δ(r+e))
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where the equality follows by coherence (Proposition 10, coherence). The result follows
by the induction hypothesis.
Commutative The proof is quite tedious so we give the intuition first: renorm is com-
mutative is because renorm applies Bayes rule to rescale a subtree of (∆, ξ) and that
rescaling by Bayes rule is commutative. The proof follows in two parts. First, we
show that the two subtrees (i.e., descendants of the two d-redistribution point) we
apply rescaling to via Bayes rule to are identical no matter which order we apply
renormalization in. Second, it suffices to show that the rescaling on the two subtrees
is commutative (due to the subtree property of renormalization).
We start with part one. We claim that the two d-redistribution points encountered
are identical no matter which order we carry the renormalization. We show this by
a direct (and tedious) case analysis. Suppose we apply renorm
δ
(d)
1
first. We perform
case analysis on whether (1) ρ
H,δ
(d)
1
∈ anc(δ
(d)
1 ⊔ δ
(d)
2 ), (2) or ρH,δ(d)1
= δ
(d)
1 ⊔ δ
(d)
2 , or (3)
ρ
H,δ
(d)
1
∈ desc(δ
(d)
1 ⊔ δ
(d)
2 ) where δ
(d)
1 ⊔ δ
(d)
2 is the deepest common ancestor of δ
(d)
1 and
δ
(d)
2 .
Consider the first case ρ
H,δ
(d)
1
∈ anc(δ
(d)
1 ⊔ δ
(d)
2 ). Observe that ρrenorm
δ
(d)
1
(H),δ
(d)
2
=
ρ
H,δ
(d)
1
. Otherwise, it would contradict that ρ
H,δ
(d)
1
has supported children. We need
to show that we encounter the same renormalization point applying renorm
δ
(d)
2
first.
To see this, ρ
H,δ
(d)
2
≥ δ
(d)
1 ⊔ δ
(d)
2 contradicts that ρH,δ(d)1
has supported children. Thus
ρ
H,δ
(d)
2
∈ anc(δ
(d)
1 ⊔ δ
(d)
2 ). Thus we conclude that ρH,δ(d)1
= ρ
H,δ
(d)
1
because both give
the deepest common ancestor with supported children in a tree. Finally, we conclude
that ρ
H,δ
(d)
2
= ρ
renorm
δ
(d)
2
(H),δ
(d)
1
as required.
Consider the second case ρ
H,δ
(d)
1
= δ
(d)
1 ⊔ δ
(d)
2 . There are two subcases to consider:
either ρ
renorm
δ
(d)
1
(H),δ
(d)
2
∈ anc(δ
(d)
1 ⊔ δ
(d)
2 ) or ρrenorm
δ
(d)
1
(H),δ
(d)
2
= δ
(d)
1 ⊔ δ
(d)
2 .
Consider the first subcase ρ
renorm
δ
(d)
1
(H),δ
(d)
2
∈ anc(δ
(d)
1 ⊔ δ
(d)
2 ). We conclude that the
path from ρ
H,δ
(d)
1
to δ
(d)
2 is the only path that is positively supported after applying
renorm
δ
(d)
1
(H). We see that we encounter the same renormalization points applying
renorm
δ
(d)
2
first by performing an even deeper case analysis: either (1) ρ
H,δ
(d)
2
= ρ
H,δ
(d)
1
)
which occurs when the path from ρ
H,δ
(d)
1
to δ
(d)
2 is the only path that is positively
supported after applying renorm
δ
(d)
2
(H) or (2) ρ
H,δ
(d)
2
= ρ
renorm
δ
(d)
1
(H),δ
(d)
1
). Thus we
conclude that the result holds in this subcase.
Consider the second subcase ρ
renorm
δ
(d)
1
(H),δ
(d)
2
= δ
(d)
1 ⊔δ
(d)
2 . We show that we encounter
the same renormalization points applying renorm
δ
(d)
2
first. Observe that ρ
H,δ
(d)
2
=
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δ
(d)
1 ⊔δ
(d)
2 . Otherwise, it would contradict that ρrenorm
δ
(d)
1
(H),δ
(d)
2
has supported children.
Similarly, observe that ρ
renorm
δ
(d)
2
(H),δ
(d)
1
= δ
(d)
1 ⊔ δ
(d)
2 . Thus the result follows.
Consider the third case ρ
H,δ
(d)
1
∈ desc(δ
(d)
1 ⊔ δ
(d)
2 ). Observe that ρrenorm
δ
(d)
1
(H),δ
(d)
2
≥
δ
(d)
1 ⊔ δ
(d)
2 because ρH,δ(d)1
has supported children. There are two subcases to consider:
either (1) ρ
renorm
δ
(d)
1
(H),δ
(d)
2
= δ
(d)
1 ⊔ δ
(d)
2 or (2) ρrenorm
δ
(d)
1
(H),δ
(d)
2
∈ desc(δ
(d)
1 ⊔ δ
(d)
2 ).
Consider the first subcase ρ
renorm
δ
(d)
1
(H),δ
(d)
2
= δ
(d)
1 ⊔ δ
(d)
2 . We show that we encounter
the same renormalization points applying renorm
δ
(d)
2
first. Observe that ρ
H,δ
(d)
2
=
δ
(d)
1 ⊔δ
(d)
2 . Otherwise, it would contradict that ρrenorm
δ
(d)
1
(H),δ
(d)
2
has supported children.
Next, we observe that ρ
renorm
δ
(d)
2
(H),δ
(d)
1
= ρ
H,δ
(d)
1
as required.
Consider the second subcase ρ
renorm
δ
(d)
1
(H),δ
(d)
2
∈ desc(δ
(d)
1 ⊔ δ
(d)
2 ). Observe that the
subtrees of ρ
H,δ
(d)
1
and ρ
renorm
δ
(d)
1
(H),δ
(d)
2
are non-overlapping so that the result follows.
Consequently, there are two d-redistribution points ρ
δ
(d)
a
and ρ
δ
(d)
b
and three cases to
consider to see that renormalization is commutative for part two of the proof: either
(1) ρ
δ
(d)
a
and ρ
δ
(d)
b
are not ancestors of each other, (2) ρ
δ
(d)
a
= ρ
δ
(d)
b
, or (3) ρ
δ
(d)
a
is
an ancestor of ρ
δ
(d)
b
without loss of generality. The first case is straightforward and
second case can be seen as a special case of the third.
Consider the third case where ρ
δ
(d)
a
is an ancestor of ρ
δ
(d)
b
. We show that the result
holds by another (tedious) case analysis. Let X† , X ∪
⋃
x∈X desc(x). We perform
a further case analysis on the position of δ(e) with respect to the support function.
Note that the renormalization points may be encountered in the same order or differ-
ent order. If they are encountered in the same order, then the values are obviously
identical. Thus we consider the case when they are encountered in a different order.
It suffices to consider the case where ρ
δ
(d)
a
is encountered first followed by ρ
δ
(d)
b
by
symmetry.
Let D+ρ
δ
(d)
a
, D+
H,δ
(d)
a
and D−ρ
H,δ
(d)
a
, child(ρ
H,δ
(d)
a
)\D+ρ
H,δ
(d)
a
. Moreover let
D+ρ
H,δ
(d)
b
, D+
renorm
δ
(d)
a
(H),δ
(d)
b
and
D−ρ
δ
(d)
b
, child(ρ
renorm
δ
(d)
a
(H),δ
(d)
b
)\D+ρ
renorm
δ
(d)
a
(H),δ
(d)
b
.
The table below summarizes the values assigned to the different regions.
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Case δ(e) ∈ ρ
δ
(d)
a
, ρ
δ
(d)
b
ρ
δ
(d)
b
, ρ
δ
(d)
a
(D−ρ
δ
(d)
a
)† 0 0
(D+ρ
δ
(d)
a
\ child(δ
(d)
b ))
†
Z
δ
(d)
a
Z+
δ
(d)
a
H(δ(e))
Z¯
δ
(d)
a
Z¯+
δ
(d)
a
H(δ(e))
(D−ρ
δ
(d)
b
)† 0 0
(D+ρ
δ
(d)
b
)†
Z
δ
(d)
a
Z+
δ
(d)
a
Z
δ
(d)
b
Z+
δ
(d)
b
H(δ(e))
Z¯
δ
(d)
a
Z¯+
δ
(d)
a
Z¯
δ
(d)
b
Z¯+
δ
(d)
b
H(δ(e))
After substituting definitions, we see that
Z
δ
(d)
a
Z+
δ
(d)
a
=
∑
δ(f)∈child(ρ
δ
(d)
a
)H(δ
(f))∑
δ(f)∈D+
δ
(d)
a
H(δ(f))
and
Z¯
δ
(d)
a
Z¯+
δ
(d)
a
=
∑
δ(f)∈child(ρ
δ
(d)
a
) renormδ(d)
b
(H)(δ(f))∑
δ(f)∈D+
δ
(d)
a
renorm
δ
(d)
b
(H)(δ(f))
are identical. Similarly, we obtain that
Z
δ
(d)
a
Z+
δ
(d)
a
and
Z¯
δ
(d)
a
Z¯+
δ
(d)
a
are also identical. Thus the
result follows.
4. On Conjecturing
Although conjecturing does not directly lead to a proof, it is an integral part of proving
in practice: we require interesting conjectures to prove or disprove and attempting a proof
may lead to interesting conjectures. In this section, we examine conjecturing as (statistical)
model selection. When we introduce the game, we will see how conjecturing can be applied
as a strategy for playing the game (Section 5).
A conjecture, in its barest form, is a well-formed mathematical statement that we (1) do
not have a proof for and (2) consider “interesting”. The first criterion is obviously necessary.
The second criterion is also necessary but is inherently subjective. With these two criterion
in mind, we define a conjecturer now.
Definition 26 A conjecturer is a function
conj : HT(L)→
∏
d∈N
Perm(Set(∆(d)))
where Perm(X) is the set of permutations on the finite set X.
30
On Learning to Prove
A conjecturer maps a HT H and a depth d to a permutation on the powerset of depth d
constituents. A depth d conjecture is a depth d dnf, i.e., it is a subset X ⊆ ∆(d) of depth
d constituents. By convention, ∅ corresponds to conjecturing ⊥. A permutation on the
powerset of ∆(d) thus provides a ranking of depth d conjectures that we use as a proxy
for ranking how interesting depth d conjectures are. We explore how to construct rankings
next.
4.1 “Interesting” as Model Selection
We convert the problem of quantifying how interesting a conjecture is to a model selection
problem. Thus we take a statistical viewpoint of conjecturing. We accomplish this in two
stages.
Model class First, we identify each depth d conjecture with a model25 from some class of
models H. That is, we define a surjection m : Set(∆(d))→H from conjectures of any
depth to the model class H.
Model scoring Second, we define a scoring function S : H → R for the model class H,
potentially subject to regularization. Given a scoring function S : H → R, we can
create a ranking on H as h1 ≤ h2 when S (h1) ≤ S (h2) with ties broken arbitrarily.
We give an example of a model class and a scoring function, beginning by identifying a
subclass of finite distributions as an example model class for conjectures.
Example 5 (Distribution conjecture class) Let DD , {δ
(d) 7→ H(δ(d)) | δ(d) ∈ D} for
D ∈ Set(∆(d)) and
D
†
D = DD ∪ {∗ 7→ 1−
∑
(δ(d) 7→b)∈DD
b}
be the distribution that adds a unique element ∗ representing the remaining unassigned belief.
We call the class
D , {D†D | D ∈ Set(∆
(D))}
of finite distributions a distribution conjecture class.
Now that we have a model class for conjectures, we can define a corresponding scoring
functions for models to rank conjectures.
Example 6 (Likelihood-entropy scoring) A likelihood-entropy scoring function for the
distribution conjecture class D scores conjectures as a function of their likelihood and en-
tropy: we have
L (D†D) ,
c(|D|) ℓ(DD)
H |D|
·
{
H(D†
D+
) when D+ 6= ∅
0 otherwise
where D+ , {δ(d) | DD(δ
(d)) > 0}, H is entropy, H |X| is the entropy of the uniform
distribution over |X| elements, ℓ(DD) =
∑
(x 7→b)∈DD ,x 6=∗
b is the total probability except for
∗, and c : {1, . . . , |X|} → R+ is a positive and concave function over {1, . . . , |X|} ordered
25. We use model in the statistical sense and not the model-theoretic sense for which have used the word
structure instead.
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by ≤. We calculate the entropy of the modified distribution D†
D+
that only considers the
constituents with positive probability. The factor
c(|D|) ℓ(DD)
H |D|
is a form of regularization. First, recall that the entropy of a uniform distribution increases
as the set of support increases so that an unnormalized measure would be biased towards
selecting larger dnfs. Thus we normalize by the entropy of the uniform distribution of the
appropriate size. Second, we want to encourage dnfs that include enough possibilities. This
is what the concave function c achieves. Lastly, we want to ensure that the conjecture
captures enough of what we believe to be true. Otherwise, we would be encouraged towards
selecting the least believable constituents because these provide the most information. A
likelihood-entropy score can be thought of as measuring how “informative” a conjecture is
weighted by how likely it is.
We check the conjectures generated by a conjecturer using a likelihood-entropy scoring
function with beliefs H under two extremes.
Uninformative Given an uninformative HT H that assigns beliefs uniformly to con-
stituents at every depth, the ranking produced by a likelihood-entropy scoring ranks
conjectures is solely a function of the number of constituents in their dnf. This follows
directly from the definition of a likelihood-entropy score.
Omniscient Given a depth HT H, a likelihood-entropy score ranks conjectures at ev-
ery depth containing consistent constituents higher than conjectures mentioning no
consistent constituents. To see this, observe that if a conjecture has no consistent
constituents, then D+ = ∅ and thus gets assigned score 0. Moreover, a conjecture
that contains consistent constituents has D+ 6= ∅ so that it gets assigned positive
score. A conjecturer that knows all logical truths will rank true statements according
to the regularization factor and higher than any false statement.
4.2 Top-down versus Bottom-up Regularization
The regularization given by the concave function c in likelihood-entropy scoring can be seen
as a form of bottom-up regularization in that we control the size of the conjecture so that
it describes just enough possibilities. We can also impose top-down regularization where
we control the sizes and form of the first-order sentences in addition to the sizes of their
dnfs. The intuition for additionally considering top-down regularization is that we would
like the conjectures to be “compact and structured enough” to write down in addition to
describing just enough possibilities. Let K be a finite set of first-order sentences, dmin be
the minimum depth of formulas in K, and DdK , {δ
(d) | δ(d) ∈ dnf(φ(d)), φ(d) ∈ K}.
Definition 27 A K-regularized conjecturer is a function
conjK : HT(L)→
∏
d≥dmin
Perm(Set(Ddk)) .
Thus a conjecturer is a L-regularized conjecturer. The definition of a K-regularized con-
jecturer allows any kind of subset, although it may be useful to use the regularization to
restrict the form of the sentences.
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Example 7 Any finite subset of Σ0n or Π
0
n can be used to form a K-regularized conjecturer.
Recall that these sentences constrain ∀ and ∃ to occur in an alternating sequence.
Example 8 The singleton set K , {δ(d)} can be used to form a K-regularized conjecturer.
In particular, such a conjecturer only generates conjectures that are refinements of δ(d).
5. On Games and Proving
We introduce an alternating-turn game that involves determining the consistency of con-
stituents. Note that agents are not directly proving theorems so we begin by showing how to
construct a prover from beliefs represented by a HT (Section 5.1). In particular, the prover
is complete when logical omniscience is attained (i.e., a depth HT) and sound if the agent
maintains reasonable beliefs. We then introduce the game formally (Section 5.2), examine
game play (Section 5.3), and identify how conjecturing fits into game play (Section 5.4).
The game is amenable to self-play training similar to those used to learn Chess and Go,
although the challenging task of implementation and empirically testing self-play is beyond
the scope of this paper (Section 5.5). One reason for the technical difficulty is that the
representation has intractable space requirements. We will comment on how to reduce the
space complexity in the next section by using abstractions (Section 6).
Remark 28 (On supervised learning) We note that we can formulate the learning of
a function approximating a depth HT H as a supervised learning problem as opposed to
constructing a game that is amenable (in principle) to self-play training as we will do in
the rest of the section. Although this is possible, we will need to devise a methodology
for selecting constituents in the supervised approach. In particular, the typical assumption
of independent and identically distributed samples of constituents and their valuations of
consistency is not a good one in this setting as constituents can be related to one another
via the refinement relation. Indeed, as we will see, agents learn in Pathfinder by considering
sequences of dependent constituents that are refinements of one another.
5.1 From Beliefs to Proofs
Before we introduce the game, we explain how to extract a proof attempt from beliefs
represented by a HT H. Define a function proveH : L → 2 as
proveH(φ
(d)) =
{
⊤
∑
δ(d)∈dnf(φ(d))H(δ
(d)) = 1
⊥ otherwise.
We show that the function proveH converts reasonable beliefs into proofs.
Proposition 29 (Soundness and completeness)
Sound The procedure proveH is sound if H is reasonable.
Complete The procedure proveH is complete whenever H is a depth HT.
Proof
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Figure 7: Example of game flow in Pathfinder. Player one selects δ
(1)
i1
. Player two selects
δ
(2)
i1i2
. Player one believes that δ
(2)
i1i2
is inconsistent and issues a challenge, thus
ending the game.
1. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that proveH(φ
(d)) = ⊤ but φ(d) is inconsistent.
Thus there is at least one consistent constituent δ(d) /∈ dnf(φ(d)). We conclude that
H(δ(d)) = 0 when proveH(φ
(d)) = ⊤ because
∑
δ(d)∈dnf(φ(d))H(δ
(d)) = 1 and by the
normalization property of HTs. This contracts the assumption that H(δ(d)) > 0 when
it is not trivially inconsistent.
2. Recall that a formula is logically valid iff its dnf contains all consistent constituents.
The first part shows that agents are not required to be logically omniscient in order to
obtain a sound prover. The second part of the proposition above indicates that we are only
at risk of losing completeness. The situation intuitively makes sense: so long as we are not
logically omniscient, we will not be able to prove every true theorem. We turn our attention
now towards learning beliefs H.
5.2 Pathfinder: A Game for Learning Beliefs
Pathfinder is an alternating-turn game where the goal of the game is to recognize incon-
sistent constituents. Because we can extract a prover given a HT H as above, agents that
learn to recognize the consistency of constituents well will learn to be a better theorem
prover (i.e., be able to prove more theorems).
A player is given a depth d constituent δ(d) and allowed to make one of two moves.
1. A player can select a refinement constituent δ(d+1) ≥ δ(d) and pass play to the other
player. The select move introduces an existential which intuitively corresponds to the
construction of an auxiliary object that may be useful for the proof.26
26. As a concrete instance, consider proofs in Euclidean geometry. These proofs involve constructing the
appropriate points, lines, and circles so that the conclusion is “obvious”. This method of proof contrasts
with the design of many first-order automated theorem provers where quantifiers are lifted to the head
of the formula and eliminated.
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2. A player can issue a challenge meaning that the player believes the constituent to be
inconsistent.27 If δ(d) is revealed to be inconsistent, the player issuing the challenge
wins. Otherwise, if δ(d) is revealed to be consistent, then the player issuing the
challenge loses.
In order to play the game well, the players need to develop an intuition about which con-
stituents “look” inconsistent. Figure 7 illustrates the flow of an example game. We describe
the game more formally now.
Let ∗ represent the terminal state reached after a challenge is issued. Let X , ∆ ∪ {∗}
denote the states of Pathfinder. We write x ∈ X to denote a generic state or δ(d) ∈ X when
it is a constituent. Define the positions of Pathfinder to be the set
P ,
⋃
d∈N
Seqd(X)
of all finite sequences of states.
Let the two players be O for odd and E for even. Define the turn order function
T : P → {O,E} as
T (x1 . . . xn) =
{
O n even
E n odd
.
Thus player O plays the positions that have even length (resulting in a position that has
odd length) and player E plays the positions that have odd length.
Next, we define transition relation  : P → P → 2 to indicate the legal moves. We give
the inference rules generating  below.
Select δ(0) . . . δ(d)  δ(0) . . . δ(d) δ(d+1) whenever δ(d) ≤ δ(d+1)
Challenge δ(0) . . . δ(d)  δ(0) . . . δ(d) ∗
The player whose turn it is to move chooses either select or challenge.
Finally, we define the function W : P → {O,E} which determines which player wins:
W (x1 . . . xn−1 ∗) =


O n odd and xn−1 inconsistent
E n odd and xn−1 consistent
O n even and xn−1 inconsistent
E n even and xn−1 consistent
.
We can define the game now that we have all the requisite components.
Definition 30 The Pathfinder game is given by the tuple P , (P, T, ,W ).
We emphasize that the challenge move of Pathfinder game play involves determining the
inconsistency of first-order statements. Thus it is only semi-decidable. One can implement
27. We emphasize that the condition is inconsistency and not trivial inconsistency. Thus the challenge move
requires an oracle to implement. Naturally, testing for trivial inconsistency up to a certain depth can
serve as a proxy test for inconsistency. By the constituent completeness theorem, testing for trivial
inconsistency up to “infinite” depth is equivalent to testing for inconsistency.
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Algorithm 1 Strategy for rational agent AH.
1: function step(δ(d))
2: if
∑
δ
′(d+1)≥δ(d) H(δ
′(d+1)) = 0 then
3: challenge
4: else
5: if flip(1−H(δ(d))) = true then
6: challenge
7: else
8: select δ(d+1) ≥ δ(d) with probability H(δ
(d+1))
∑
δ
′(d+1)≥δ(d)
H(δ
′(d+1))
a modified winning condition W e which uses the decidable condition of trivial inconsistency
instead.
W e(x1 . . . xn−1 ∗) =


O n odd and y trivially inconsistent
E n odd and y not trivially inconsistent
O n even and y trivially inconsistent
E n even and y not trivially inconsistent
where y = expand(e, xn−1). We have that lime→∞W
e =W by the constituent completeness
theorem.
5.3 Playing Pathfinder
As we have just seen, the rules for Pathfinder game are quite simple. Nevertheless, like many
other games whose rules are easy to state, playing Pathfinder “well” is difficult because it
reduces to determining the consistency of first-order statements. We can analyze the plays
made by agents (i.e., what it means to play “well”) using the formalization above. Towards
this end, we model an agent as using a HT to guide their game play for Pathfinder.
Suppose an agent AH playing Pathfinder uses a HT H to represent its beliefs in mathe-
matical statements. Intuitively, we should be able to derive a strategy for playing Pathfinder
that is compatible with the agent’s beliefs H. In essence, it should issue challenges and select
constituents in proportion to the probabilityH assigns to the consistency of each constituent.
More formally, a strategy for a player says for each position what the next position to play
is when it is that player’s turn. We say that the agent AH is rational if it plays the strategy
given by Algorithm 1 (hence it plays a mixed strategy). In words, the agent first checks that
it does not believe all continuations are inconsistent as
∑
δ
′(d+1)≥δ(d) H(δ
′(d+1)) 6= 0 and chal-
lenges if it is (lines 2–3). If it is not, then the agent challenges with probability 1−H(δ(d))
(lines 5–6). With the remainder of the probability, it selects a constituent δ(d+1) ≥ δ(d) in
proportion to its belief in its consistency
H(δ(d+1))∑
δ
′(d+1)≥δ(d) H(δ
′(d+1))
(lines 7–8).
As we might expect, a rational agent with perfect knowledge is able to achieve optimal
play : (1) only challenge inconsistent constituents and (2) only select consistent constituents.
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Proposition 31 A rational agent AH where H is a depth HT achieves optimal play.
Proof By assumption, H is a depth HT so it assigns inconsistent constituents probability 0.
We proceed by case analysis. δ(d) is inconsistent when
∑
δ
′(d+1)≥δ(d) H(δ
′(d+1)) = 0 so a chal-
lenge is issued. If H(δ(d)) = 0, then the agent challenges with probability 1. If H(δ(d)) > 0,
then the agent selects only consistent constituents and passes play to the second player.
The game of Pathfinder continues ad infinitum with optimal play, i.e., is drawn. Recall
that a strategy is winning if the strategy always produces a win no matter what the other
player does.
Proposition 32 There are no winning strategies.
Proof The contrapositive of the completeness theorem for constituents gives that every
consistent constituent has a refinement. Hence both players always have a non-losing con-
tinuation.
Of course, optimal play is not computable as a depth HT is not computable.
We emphasize that Pathfinder game play involves determining the consistency of first-
order statements and not the logical validity of first-order statements. One consequence of
this choice is that there is learning signal in independent statements.
Remark 33 (Learning signal in independent statements) An agent chooses between
two outputs when playing Pathfinder: (1) inconsistent (i.e., constituent is satisfiable in no
models) or (2) consistent (i.e., constituent is satisfiable in at least one model). In particular,
note that a consistent constituent at depth d is an independent (i.e., unprovable) statement
whenever there are at least two consistent constituents at depth d. This follows as a conse-
quence of the mutual exclusivity of any two constituents at depth d. Thus there is learning
signal in the independent regions of a HT. Put another way, an agent that plays Pathfinder
well is incentivized towards playing independent constituents.28 This situation differs from
a theorem proving setup where agents choose between classifying input statements as (1)
inconsistent or (2) logically valid (i.e., satisfiable in every model or provable) so that the
learning signal obtained from exploring independent regions is less obvious.
5.4 Incorporating Conjecturing
We can incorporate conjecturing into the playing of Pathfinder. We say that an agent is
a conjecturing agent if it plays the (mixed) strategy given in Algorithm 2. The conditions
for challenging are identical to the ones played by a rational agent. The difference occurs
in the selection of the next constituent to play (lines 7–9). In this case, the agent uses a
K-regularized conjecturer where K = expand(δ(d)) to generate a ranking of conjectures π.
Next, the agent selects the highest ranked conjecture π1 and selects the constituent from
that excluding ∗ following the probabilities given by H.
Proposition 34 A conjecturing agent AH using a likelihood-entropy scoring function where
H is a depth HT achieves optimal play.
28. The only time an agent will play a provable constituent is when that constituent is the only consistent
constituent at that depth.
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Algorithm 2 Strategy for conjecturing agent AH.
1: function step(δ(d))
2: if
∑
δ
′(d+1)≥δ(d) H(δ
′(d+1)) = 0 then
3: challenge
4: else
5: if flip(1−H(δ(d))) = true then
6: challenge
7: else
8: π ← conj{δ(d)}(H)(d+ 1)
9: select δ(d+1) with probability H(δ
(d+1))
∑
δ
′(d+1)∈pi1,δ
′(d+1) 6=∗
H(δ
′(d+1))
Proof The only difference is the select case. We claim that π1 contains consistent con-
stituents. Assume for the sake of contradiction that it does not. As a likelihood-entropy
scoring function ranks conjectures containing consistent constituents higher than those that
contain none, then π1 contains no consistent constituents. But this means that δ
(d) is incon-
sistent because it contains no refinement constituents that are consistent, a contradiction.
As a depth HT assigns inconsistent constituents 0 belief and π1 contains consistent con-
stituents, an agent selecting constituents in proportion to their beliefs will select a consistent
constituent as required.
5.5 A Note on Self-Play for Pathfinder
We note that self-play training similar to those described in the literature (e.g., see Tesauro,
1992; Silver et al., 2016, 2017) is applicable to Pathfinder as it is an alternating-turn game
with symmetric play. We recall the standard setup here to make the idea concrete. Of
course, the implementation and empirical testing of self-play setups are the most challenging
and non-trivial portions of the task, which we do not address in this paper.
Let x1 . . . xt be a sequence of Pathfinder positions where xt = δ
(0) . . . δ(d) ∗ is a terminal
board state. We truncate games so that they take at most N steps. If no challenge is issued
within N steps, we say that the game is drawn. Define a reward signal zO for player O as
zO , 1 when O wins, zO , −1 when O loses, and zO , 0 when there is a draw. As usual,
the reward signal zE for the other player E is the negation zE = −zO.
Define a parameterized function
fθ :
∏
d∈N
Ψ(d) → Dist(∆(d+1) ∪ {challenge})× [0, 1]
where Dist(X) gives the collection of finite distributions on X which takes a current
depth d and a path through the refinement tree, and produces a distribution on con-
stituents to select or to challenge paired with an estimate of the expected value (with
respect to the move probabilities) of winning for player O starting at the current path.
Suppose we have taken the refinement path δ(0) ≤ . . . ≤ δ(d) and that f(δ(0) . . . δ(d)) =
(p1, . . . , pKd+1 , pchallenge, zˆO). A self-play game can be generated by selecting the move in
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proportion to (p1, . . . , pKd+1 , pchallenge). The hope is to learn the parameters θ (e.g., via
self-play) such that π1(fθ) ≈ H where H is a depth HT. Note that we cannot adjust the
parameters arbitrarily if we hope to maintain guarantees on the derived prover.
Remark 35 (Maintaining reasonable beliefs) It is important in the course of self-play
to maintain reasonable beliefs. Notably, if H is not reasonable, the resulting prover will not be
sound because at least one consistent constituent will be assigned zero weight. Provided that
we initialize a self-play agent with reasonable beliefs and ensure that beliefs in constituents
are never zeroed unless they are known to be inconsistent, then the agent will maintain
reasonable beliefs.
Remark 36 (Renormalization as an update rule) When an agent playing Pathfinder
discovers a constituent to be inconsistent, the agent can apply renormalization (see renorm,
Section 3.1.3) to refute beliefs in that constituent and all of its descendants and rescale
the rest of its beliefs appropriately. Notably, eliminating beliefs in an inconsistent con-
stituent and applying renormalization leaves reasonable beliefs invariant. In this case, we
say that renorm respects reasonable beliefs. Naturally, there are other update rules that
respect reasonable beliefs. In particular, we can replace rescaling with any other method
of redistributing beliefs provided that we distribute the beliefs to the appropriate supported
constituents.
Although Pathfinder is not implementable as presented, we may still wonder in prin-
ciple how to measure the performance of a system that plays Pathfinder. Obviously, the
standard theorem proving setup where one measures the percentage of theorems proved in
a benchmark of theorems can be applied in our setting. Given learned beliefs H, we can
measure the percentage of theorems proved by proveH. We can also measure the analog of
a “partial proof” for beliefs. More concretely, we can check that proveH(φ) > 1 − ǫ⊤ for
true statements φ ∈ B where 0 < ǫ⊤ < 1 and proveH(φ) < ǫ⊥ for false statement φ ∈ B
where 0 < ǫ⊥ < 1. Beyond using the beliefs output by a system at a single point in time,
we can also consider the evolution of beliefs in statements over time.
Proposition 37 (Evolution of beliefs) Let (Hn)n∈N be the sequence of HTs defined in
Equation 1 and (βn)n∈N be the associated sequence of probability assignments to first-order
statements. Then (βn(φ(d)))n∈N is eventually constant for any sentence φ
(d).
Proof Recall that renorm only affects the descendants of a e-renormalization point. As the
dnf of a sentence φ(d) only has a finite number of ancestors, the number of e-renormalization
points is finite. Thus the probability assignment (βn(φ(d)))n∈N is eventually constant.
Note that the sequence of probability assignments (βn(φ(d)))n∈N is not guaranteed to be
increasing for a logically valid statement or decreasing for an inconsistent statement. More-
over, although the probability assignment for a statement only changes a finite number of
times, the number of times that the probability assignment changes is not computable.
6. On Abstraction
Both conjecturing and Pathfinder are not practically implementable as currently presented
because there are a super-exponential number of constituents as a function of depth resulting
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in a HT having a super-exponential branching factor. The reason that there are so many
depth d constituents is because they provide the finest grained view of possible kinds of
worlds describable with respect to d individuals. However, for most intents and purposes,
we can take a coarser grained view that captures the details that we care about. In other
words, we can treat certain possibilities as observationally indistinguishable to reduce the
space complexity of a dnfs, i.e., make abstractions and lazily consider more details as needed
(Section 6.1 and Section 6.2). At the end of the section, we will introduce Trailblazer, a
modification of the Pathfinder game, that utilizes abstractions and laziness to trade-off
completeness for on-demand space requirements (Section 6.3).
6.1 Filtrations
The basic idea we have in mind is to control the “resolution” at which constituents distin-
guish possibilities by partitioning each set of depth d constituents in a compatible manner
across depth. Each cell of the partition describes all of the possibilities identified by that
cell’s member constituents.
Let {C
(d)
i } be a partition of ∆
(d). For each C
(d)
i , define the super constituent σ
(d)
i with
respect to a partition {C
(d)
i } as
σ
(d)
i ,
∨
δ(d)∈C
(d)
i
δ(d) .
A super constituent collapses multiple distinct possibilities into one possibility, and thus,
can be viewed as a form of abstraction. Let S(d) be the set of super constituents with respect
to the partition {C
(d)
i }. Naturally, a super constituent is said to be trivially inconsistent if
all of its members are trivially inconsistent.
Definition 38 We say F = ({C
(d)
i })d∈N where each {C
(d)
i } is a partition of ∆
(d) is a
filtration of (∆, ξ) if adjacent elements satisfy the following condition: for every cell C
(d)
j ∈
{C
(d)
i }, there exists a subset D ⊆ {C
(d+1)
i } such that C
(d)
j =
⋃
C
(d+1)
k
∈D
C
(d+1)
k .
In words, we have a filtration if the partition at depth d + 1 of ∆(d+1) can be used to
form a partition of each cell at depth d. A filtration induces a corresponding set of super
constituents.
We can lift the refinement partial order on partitions to filtrations. Let F be the set
of all filtrations. We have that (F ,⊑) is a partial order where F1 ⊑ F2 if each depth d
partition in F2 is finer than the corresponding depth d partition in F1. At one extreme,
we have a filtration consisting of one cell that contains every constituent so that it has the
lowest resolution. At the other extreme, each filtration assigns each constituent to its own
set so that we have the highest resolution possible so that no space savings is gained. We
can intuitively think of the “resolution” of a filtration F as the height in the Hasse diagram
of F . Naturally, some resolutions are incomparable.
Super constituents possess some of the same properties as constituents.
Proposition 39
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γ(d)
≈
⊤
(±)b1(∃x1)
γ
(0)
1 [x1]
¬(∃x2)
γ
(0)
1 [x1, x2]
...
...
¬(∃x2)
γ
(0)
|G02 |
[x1, x2]
...
...
(±)
b
|Gd−1
1
|(∃x1)
γ
(0)
|G01 |
[x1]
(∃x2)
γ
(0)
1 [x1, x2]
...
...
(∃x2)
γ
(0)
|G02 |
[x1, x2]
...
...
. . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .. . . . . .
Figure 8: An attributive constituent tree of depth d where nodes are existential formula (ex-
cept for root node) and edges indicate the scope of the quantifier. Each attributive
constituent of depth d corresponds to choosing each bi ∈ 2 in the attributive con-
stituent tree of depth d. We enumerate every combination of (±) from left to
right, starting with all negations and moving to all positives.
Mutually exclusive Any two super constituents of the same depth are mutually exclusive.
Expansion Every depth d super constituent can be written as a disjunction of super con-
stituents of greater depth.
Completeness A super constituent is inconsistent if and only if all of its refinements at
some depth are trivially inconsistent.
Proof These properties all follow directly from the properties of partitions.
In general, we lose existence of super constituents: there are depth d sentence φ(d) that
cannot be written as a disjunction of depth d super constituents. For example, the super
constituents obtained from the trivial filtration cannot express logically invalid statements.
We say that a filtration is complete if it assigns every consistent constituent to its own cell.
Proposition 40 (Complete existence) Every depth d sentence can be written as a dis-
junction of depth d super constituents given by a complete filtration ({C(d)})d∈N.
Proof Recall that we can adjoin inconsistent constituents to a dnf without affecting its
satisfiability.
As we might expect by now, a complete filtration is not computable.
6.2 Choosing Filtrations
For pragmatic purposes, we will need to cleverly choose a filtration. One method for con-
structing filtrations uses the fact that depth d constituents indicate which depth d − 1
attributive constituents (with 1 free individual term) exist or not. As a reminder, con-
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stituents are defined in terms of attributive constituents as
δ(d)s =
∧
(r1,s1)∈G
d−1
1
(±)s(r1,s1)(∃x1)γ
(d−1)
r1,s1
[x1] .
Let o : Gd−11 → {O, I} be an observation of depth d constituents where o(r1, s1) = O
means that we observe position (r1, s1) and o(r1, s1) = I means that we ignore position
(r1, s1). Then we can define an equivalence class on constituents δ
(d)
s ∼o δ
(d)
t if s(r1, s1) =
t(r1, s1) whenever o(r1, s1) = O. The collection of equivalence classes forms a filtration.
Whenever o(r1, s1) = I, we have that every super constituent contains both ¬(∃x1)γ
(d)
r′,s′ [x1]
and (∃x1)γ
(d)
r′,s′ [x1] so that we can no longer tell the two possibilities apart. When o(r1, s1) =
I for every (r1, s1) ∈ G
d−1
1 , the induced filtration produces exactly one super constituent.
When o(r1, s1) = O for every (r1, s1) ∈ G
d−1
1 , the induced filtration assigns each constituent
to its own set.
We can further break down the construction of filtrations by constructing an observation
of depth d constituents using their substructure. Unfolding the recursive definition of a
constituent δ
(d)
s by depth, we see that it is a formula of the form
δ(d) =
∧
(r1,s1)∈G
d−1
1
(±)s(r1,s1)(∃x1)γ
(0)
r1
[x1] ∧ · · · ∧
∧
rd∈G
0
d
(±)sd−1(rd)(∃xd)γ
(0)
rd
[x1, . . . , xd] .
Figure 8 gives an illustration of a depth d attributive constituent tree. In this unfolded
form, we see that a depth d attributive constituent is a tree where nodes are existential
formulas (except for the root node which is ⊤) of the form (±)b(∃xe)γ
(0)
r [x1, . . . , xe] and
edges indicate the scope of the quantifier. Each partial description (±)s(r1,s1)(∃x1)γ
(d−1)
r1,s1 [x1]
corresponds to a subtree in the attributive constituent of depth d indicating which nested
sequences of individuals described by the appropriate depth 0 attributive constituents exist
or not. We can thus construct an observation by indicating which subtrees to observe or
ignore.
6.3 Trailblazer: Game Play with Super Constituents
We can play Pathfinder using super constituents instead of constituents in the obvious way.
When Pathfinder is played with super constituents obtained from a filtration that is not
a complete filtration, agents will only be able to learn beliefs that enable them to prove a
subset of the first-order theorems. This situation makes intuitive sense: we cannot prove
certain theorems if we use inappropriate abstractions, even if we have infinite compute.
This brings us to a variation of Pathfinder called Trailblazer where agents can additionally
choose abstractions during game play.
A player is given a depth d super constituent σ(d) and allowed to make one of three
moves: select, challenge, or refine. The first two are similar to the corresponding ones in
Pathfinder. For the last move, a refine move takes a super constituent and breaks it into
smaller super constituents and chooses one of the smaller super constituents to continue
the game. This corresponds to increasing the resolution at which that player would like to
continue the game at. We describe the game more formally now.
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Let ∗ represent the terminal state reached after a challenge is issued. Let the dependent
sum X , σF :F (SF ∪ {∗}) denote the states of Trailblazer which pairs a filtration F with
the super constituents SF obtained from filtration F . Define the positions of Trailblazer to
be the set
P ,
⋃
d∈N
Seqd(X)
of all finite sequences of states.
The turn order for Trailblazer is identical to that of Pathfinder. However, whereas
player O selects constituents of odd depth and player E selects constituents of even depth
in Pathfinder, this is not the case in Trailblazer due to the refine move.
The transition relation  : P → P → 2 for Trailblazer has an additional clause for
refine. For the sake of completeness, we give all the inference rules generating  below.
Select 〈F0, σ
(0)〉 . . . 〈Fd, σ
(d)〉 〈F0, σ
(0)〉 . . . 〈Fd, σ
(d)〉 〈Fd+1, σ
(d+1)〉 when σ(d) ≤ σ(d+1)
Challenge 〈F0, σ
(0)〉 . . . 〈Fd, σ
(d)〉 〈F0, σ
(0)〉 . . . 〈Fd, σ
(d)〉 〈Fd, ∗〉
Refine 〈F0, σ
(0)〉 . . . 〈Fd, σ
(d)〉  〈F0, σ
(0)〉 . . . 〈Fd, σ
(d)〉 〈F ′d, σ
′(d)〉 whenever Fd ⊑ F
′
d and
C
′(d) ⊆ C(d) where C(d) and C
′(d) are the cells corresponding to σ(d) and σ
′(d) respec-
tively
The player whose turn it is to move chooses either select, challenge, or refine.
The winning condition W : P → {O,E} is the similar to that of Pathfinder where we
use inconsistency of super constituents as opposed to inconsistency of constituents.
Definition 41 The Trailblazer game is given by the tuple P , (P, T, ,W ).
As before, there are no winning strategies in Trailblazer and the winning strategy is not
computable. Note that we can start game play in Trailblazer with any filtration F including
the minimal one (i.e., the trivial filtration). Like Pathfinder, Trailblazer is also amenable
to self-play training.
7. Related Work
We review related work relevant to each section encountered in the body of the paper. We
apologize in advance for missing connections to the literature.
7.1 Representing Beliefs in Mathematical Statements
As a reminder, the inspiration for the definition of a HT comes from our reading of Hintikka
(1970, pg. 274–282). Our contribution is to extract and formalize some of the ideas for the
purposes of “learning to prove”. Notably, we factor out the statics of weight assignment
from the dynamics of renormalization as well as formalize renormalization as a Bayesian
update localized to subtrees of the refinement tree. To the best of our knowledge, the
application of HTs to assigning probabilities to first-order sentences and the embedding of
first-order statements are new.
There have been several approaches proposed for assigning probabilities to statements
with first-order quantifiers and probabilistic assertions. One approach defines measures
on a suitable space of structures where the probability of a statement is the measure of
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the set of structures that satisfy the statement (e.g., see Gaifman, 1964; Scott and Krauss,
1966) (see Hutter et al., 2013, for the case of higher-order logic). Logically valid statements
are satisfied in every structure so they are assigned measure 1. We are not concerned with
the ability to express probabilistic assertions in the logic because we simply use the logic
to encode mathematics as opposed to empirical propositions. However, we are concerned
with weakening the requirement that logically equivalent statements are assigned the same
probability. Demski (2012) proposes another approach (that enforces logical omniscience)
that assigns probabilities to sentences based on algorithmic probability.
There have been several approaches developed with learning in mind that assign proba-
bilities to statements based on a measure on structures. A Markov logic network (Richardson and Domingos,
2006) is a representation designed with probabilistic inference in mind that assigns proba-
bilities to statements expressed in a first-order language interpreted in models with finite
domains. The restriction to finite domains means that the setting for Markov logic networks
is effectively propositional because an existential quantifier can be encoded as a finite dis-
junction (similarly, a universal quantifier can be encoded as a finite conjunction). Thus the
quantifiers in Markov logic can be translated away at the cost of increasing the sizes of the
formulas considered. Blog (Milch et al., 2005) is a representation that combines first-order
logic and probabilities designed with Bayesian inference in mind that assigns probabilities
to statements based on a possible worlds semantics.29 Thus the representation also enforces
logical omniscience.
Garrabrant et al. (2016) propose a method called logical induction for assigning prob-
abilities to first-order sentences that only enforces logical omniscience in the limit. Thus
their objective of weakening logical omniscience for the purpose of assigning probabilities
to mathematical statements is identical to ours although our methods take opposite ap-
proaches. Logical induction identifies a market mechanism for assigning probabilities to
sentences30 and then shows that such a mechanism has nice convergence properties so that
logical omniscience holds in the limit but can fail in the finite time regime. In contrast,
we begin with a special kind of Bayesian update mechanism that has nice convergence
properties by construction and then use it to assign probabilities. Logical omniscience fails
provided that we do not start at a fixed point (i.e., a depth HT).
Another approach to weakening logical omniscience in the context of assigning proba-
bilities to logical sentences is to syntactically model an agent’s knowledge. For instance,
we can restrict logical omniscience to a subset of sentences (Gaifman, 2004) or introducing
syntax for a new modality to distinguish implication from provability (Garber, 1983).
It is also possible to adapt a syntactic approach where an agent’s reasoning capability is
modeled as bounded. For instance, Icard III (2014) studies bounded reasoning in the context
of Markov decision processes and Bjerring and Skipper (2018) studies bounded reasoning
in the context of bounded-length proofs. Under this approach, we can assign probabilities
29. Note that this differs from assigning probabilities to possible kinds of worlds as we have done which does
not directly consider the individuals in the domain of quantification.
30. The market mechanism assigns “prices” which can be interpreted as probabilities using a no Dutch book
argument.
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to statements as the probability of its provability in a proof system where inference rules
are applied non-deterministically.31
7.2 Conjecturing
Larson (2005) provides a nice survey of the field of automatic conjecture generation. Many
of these programs generate conjectures by enumerating syntax (generated from a produc-
tion system) and pruning them by a combination of hand-crafted heuristics and model
checking (e.g., see Lenat, 1976; Fajtlowicz, 1988; Haase, 1990; Colton et al., 1999). Some
methods such as the one implemented in Grafitti (Fajtlowicz, 1988) are based on the idea
of generating the strongest conjecture that has no known counter-example have produced
“research-level” conjectures (e.g., see Chung, 1988). In contrast to these operational de-
scriptions of conjecturing, our description of conjecturing is denotational. One advantage of
a denotational approach is that it is not sensitive to the order in which syntax is enumerated.
One form of conjecturing concerns making generalizations from special cases. In short,
given that we have seen that P (a1), . . . , P (aN ) where each ai is a constant that identifies a
unique element in the domain of quantification and P is a unary predicate, to what degree
do we believe that (∀x)P (x) is true? This form of conjecturing has been studied in inductive
philosophy. For example, Carnap (1952) studies inductive generalizations in monadic first-
order logic and Hintikka (1966) studies inductive generalizations on constituents. We do
not address this form of conjecturing. In particular, each P (ai) results in a depth 0 dnf
whereas (∀x)P (x) results in a depth 1 dnf so that we would need to compare conjectures
across depth. It would be an interesting direction of future work to analyze the notion of
conjecturing while taking depth into account. We note that we can apply any method of
inductive generalization defined on constituents (e.g., Hintikka, 1966) to our setting.
7.3 On Games and Proving
The connection between games and first-order logic has been recognized since the develop-
ment of modern first-order logic. The philosopher Peirce casts first-order theorem proving
as a non-alternating-turn game on existential graphs (e.g., see Charles Sanders, 1909; Sowa,
2011). That the semantics of first-order logic can be given in terms of games has also been
recognized in the literature (e.g., see Henkin, 1961; Hintikka, 1973; Lorenz and Lorenzen,
1978; Hintikka, 1999). The connection between games and other logics (especially modal
logic) has also been recognized (e.g., see van Benthem, 2014).
There are alternating-turn games that can be played on first-order structures. For
instance, the well-known Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ game, also known as a back-and-forth game,
can be used to determine the elementary equivalence of first-order structures. The game-
theoretic semantics of first-order logic gives rise to a game for checking the satisfiability of
first-order formulas in a given first-order structure, and is an alternating-turn game when
played on constituents of the second kind.32
31. One issue with this approach is that there can be multiple proofs (or refutations) of the same fact so
some notion of minimal length proof is required.
32. The game semantics of first-order logic is defined by induction on the structure of formulas. It is a game
between two players: Eloise who controls the positive fragment of the logic and Abelard who controls
the negative fragment of the logic. Negations correspond to switching who controls the positive and
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7.4 On Abstraction
Hintikka and Tuomela (1970) study the concept of definition, a form of abstraction, using
constituents. They show a la analysis on constituents that a theory employing definitions
that are explicitly definable in a first-order logic can reveal the trivial inconsistency of
sentences at shallower depths compared to a theory not employing those definitions. The
idea is that definitions are useful, even if they can be translated away, because they make
certain theorems easier to prove. In contrast, we consider abstraction as a method for
controlling the sizes of constituents, and as a cost, give up the ability to prove certain
theorems.
A form of abstraction, namely proofs with cut (i.e., proofs where we can use lemmas) can
be used to reduce the sizes of proofs in first-order proof calculi. Notably, first-order proofs
with cut-elimination increases the sizes of proofs by a super-exponential amount (Pudla´k,
1998).
8. Conclusion
In summary, we consider the problem of learning a first-order theorem prover where we
directly use a representation of beliefs in mathematical claims to construct proofs. To-
wards this end, we introduce a representation of beliefs that assigns probabilities to the
exhaustive and mutually exclusive first-order possibilities found in Hintikka’s theory of dis-
tributive normal forms. We then examine conjecturing as (statistical) model selection and
an alternating-turn proving game that involves determining the consistency of constituents.
The game is amenable (in principle) to self-play training for learning beliefs which can be
used to construct a prover that is complete when logical omniscience is attained and sound
when the beliefs are reasonable. Along the way, we give another method for assigning prob-
abilities to first-order statements that does not enforce logical omniscience as well as an
embedding of first-order logic into an associated Hilbert space.
We have left numerous questions unanswered. One direction of future work is to further
examine the embedding of first-order logic into a Hilbert space. Another direction of future
work concerns the efficient implementation and empirical testing of self-play for Trailblazer
(i.e., the variation of the Pathfinder proving game using abstractions). In particular, (1) can
we efficiently implement HTs by selecting clever abstractions and using lazy representations,
(2) what machine learning representations are effective for representing HTs, and (3) do
self-play learning systems for the game learn stable and meaningful evaluation functions
that can be used to build actual theorem provers? It is unclear to us how and if these
technical issues can be resolved. In spite of the numerous technical difficulties, we are also
intrigued by this direction of future work.
negative fragments of the logic. Eloise has a winning strategy if the formula is satisfiable in a structure
M whereas Abelard has a winning strategy if the formula is not satisfiable in M.
To see that game play on a dnf results in alternating-turn move order, recall that a con-
stituent δ(d)[y1, . . . , yk] of the second kind is a formula of the form
∧
(∃x)δ(d−1)[y1, . . . , yk, x] ∧
(∀x)
∨
δ(d−1)[y1, . . . , yk, x]. Thus, either (1) Abelard picks a conjunct from
∧
and passes play to Eloise
to instantiate an existential ∃ or (2) Abelard instantiates a universal and passes play to Eloise to play a
disjunct from
∨
. By an induction on d, we see that this results in an alternating-turn play. Play begins
with Eloise selecting a disjunct.
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It is often said that mathematics is not a spectator sport, that one learns mathematics
by doing mathematics. Po´lya expresses this sentiment in conjunction with the necessity of
“plausible reasoning”:
The result of the mathematician’s creative work is demonstrative reasoning, a
proof; but the proof is discovered by plausible reasoning, by guessing. If the
learning [emphasis added] of mathematics reflects to any degree the invention
of mathematics, it must have a place for guessing, for plausible inference. (Po´lya,
1990a, pg. vi)
If we agree with Po´lya, then the implication for applying machine learning to proving is
that we require both plausible and demonstrative reasoning in training and in inference.
Put another way, we will be missing many modes of mathematical reasoning that are useful
(at least for humans) for the discovery of proofs if we constrain ourselves to an exclusively
proof-theoretic view of proving during training.
What we have accomplished in this paper is largely to give a descriptive account of
the mathematical process where one “learns” mathematics by “doing” mathematics. More
concretely, we have seen that (1) proving requires the construction of individuals with
certain properties (as opposed to the strategy of eliminating existentials), (2) conjecturing
can be defined independently of enumerating syntax and can be employed for proving,
and (3) abstractions (and laziness) are necessary for managing complexity although we
(potentially) lose completeness. We hope that the thought experiment conducted in this
paper has shed some additional light on the activity of “learning to prove”.
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